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Abstract
Optical coordinate measurement machines (OCMMs) have proven to be an effective tool
for reducing product launch times, increasing customer satisfaction, and reducing overall
manufacturing costs in the automotive industry. With the ability to measure 100% of
body-in-white assemblies and stamped parts, OCMMs can provide detailed tracking of
process trends, real time data analysis, and measurement of process variation. OCMMs
are not a silver bullet for the current cost and quality problems facing U.S. automotive
companies. However, manufacturers who can effectively use OCMM technology to
improve vehicle quality and manufacturing costs will gain a significant competitive
advantage and be able to better utilize new and more capable process measurement
technologies.
Despite the many advantages of OCMM use, however, many installations have been
ineffective in their acquisition, implementation, and utilization of OCMM systems. This
research investigates and seeks to improve OCMM use at Chrysler Corporation's Warren
Truck Assembly Plant (WTAP), a plant that has struggled with the implementation of
these systems for over five years. Specifically, this research investigates three areas that
are critical to the successful acquisition and implementation of OCMM equipment and
similar process measurement technologies- technical design and system competence,
equipment supplier relations, and management practices. Together, these topics provide
insight into the things gone wrong at WTAP and provide the basis for a recommendation
of best practices for OCMM implementation.
From this research I draw several conclusions. First, automotive manufacturers that can
effectively use OCMM and OCMM-based technology within the confines of a larger
dimensional control strategy are in position to gain competitive advantage. As advances
in OCMM technology continue to increase, those manufactures that can effectively
integrate OCMM use within a top-down dimensional control strategy will be better able
to capitalize on these advancements in order to improve vehicle cost and quality. Second,
effective technology acquisition (for OCMMs and other technologies) requires that
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processes be designed and implemented with a focus on system metrics and tolerance
chains. During design and acquisition, systems and sub-systems must be acquired with
minimal decomposition of tolerance chains and specified with emphasis on meeting
system-level specifications. During implementation and operation, work and
accountability must be effectively organized around system tolerance chains in order to
facilitate communication and insure proper system functioning. Third, successful
implementation of new technology requires that organizations be flexible and able to
learn. This implies that organizations who focus on skill development and foster an
environment in which learning and improvement can take place will remain competitive
in the long-term.
Thesis Advisors:
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Daniel Whitney, Senior Research Scientist and Lecturer in Mechanical Engineering
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Ch. 1 Introduction to Thesis
For the past decade, the U.S. automotive industry has been chasing worldwide
automotive producers to regain a competitive advantage in cost and quality. As a result,
significant improvements have been made in vehicle costs, design, and lead times.
However, as the 1994 J.D. Powers Initial Quality Survey reports, U.S. producers still trail
best in class quality in nearly every major quality area.
SqklWRUNoise
Elect/Accessories
Paint/Moldings
Body
Interior
Engine
Wind Noise
Brakes
Transmission
Stmg/Hndlg
Temp Control
Water Leaks
PRIORITY
*_s~P a
16.I
18.6
5
13.9
Io1
1
9.0
12.9
12.5
.9
- GAP
Best in Class
Average
I -
0 10
PROBLEMS per 100 VEHICLES
Figure 1. 1994 J.D. Powers Initial Quality Survey (U.S. vs. Best in Class) 
No where is the gap between the U.S. and best-in-class more pronounced than in the
areas related to stamping and body-in-white (BIW) assembly. Squeaks/rattles/noise,
body, wind noise, steering/handling, and water leaks are all areas that are highly valued
by customers, current sources of competitive disadvantage, and affected by the quality of
the BIW assembly. Therefore, to improve in these areas, significant effort has recently
been put forth by the U.S. government and the major U.S. automotive companies to
reduce body-in-white variation.
1 Presented at "2mm Program" Workshop, Auburn Hills, MI, Nov. 2, 1994.
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In 1992, a major initiative of this effort was begun with the establishment of the "2mm
Program". The "2mm Program" was created through the Auto Body Consortium (ABC)2
with sponsorship from the University of Michigan, General Motors Corporation, Chrysler
Corporation, Perceptron, Inc., and several other small tooling companies in order to
reduce body-in-white variation and improve overall customer satisfaction within the U.S.
automotive industry. To accomplish this, the program has heavily researched BIW
variation by working directly with the automotive companies and by relying heavily on
optical coordinate measuring machine (OCMM) data. OCMMs are ideally suited to
assist this research because of their unique ability to track process trends and changes by
measuring 100% of production.
As a result of this research effort and the perceived value of variation reduction, OCMM
use has expanded rapidly in the U.S. automotive industry. With the assistance of the
"2mm Program", OCMMs have not only assisted in the detection and reduction of body-
in-white variation, but they have also proven to be an effective tool for improving product
launch times and reducing overall manufacturing costs.
In addition, the continued use of OCMMs within the automotive industry is only
expected to expand in the coming years. U.S. automotive companies have already made
large investments in OCMM equipment and are continuing to invest in new applications.
To date, nearly every U.S. owned plant currently has OCMMs and use in Europe is also
widespread. Furthermore, additional equipment based on OCMM technology continues
to be developed and will provide even faster more efficient methods for measuring
process trends and build quality in order to assist in the reduction of build variation.
OCMMs are not a silver bullet for the current problems facing U.S. automotive
companies. However, effective OCMM use and organizational commitment to variation
reduction can be a source of competitive advantage for manufacturers dedicated to
improving quality. Manufacturers who can effectively use OCMMs and OCMM-based
technology to improve vehicle quality are better able to satisfy customers and will be
better able to utilize new and more capable technologies. Therefore, manufacturers
committed to improving quality, launch times, and manufacturing costs must learn how
to effectively use these systems and they must do so quickly as competitive requirements
increase.
2 A consortium of U.S. automotive manufacturers created in part to assist in government funded research.
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Despite the tremendous benefits and potential of these systems, however, many
companies have been unsuccessful in their attempt to implement these measurement
systems. Even from plant to plant within the same company, these systems have had
varying success. And although significant resources have been spent to improve OCMM
use, problems continue to exist in the acquisition and implementation of these systems.
1.1 Research Focus and Objectives
I have been working at Chrysler Corporation's Warren Truck Assembly Plant (WTAP) in
order to learn about these systems and to improve WTAP's use of these systems. WTAP
is a plant that has struggled with the implementation of these systems for several years. I
have seen the results of these frustrations and have met my own frustrations in my
attempts to improve these systems.
Specifically, this research focuses on the three major topics that are critical to the
successful implementation of these systems. First, the technical competence of the
systems at WTAP will be discussed to provide a foundation and understanding of the
current technical problems with the existing systems at WTAP. Second, supplier
relations will be explored in order to understand why the OCMM equipment at WTAP
was ineffective from the start. And finally, management practices will be explored to
determine what went wrong and what needs to be done to improve WTAP's OCMM
systems.
In addition to analyzing WTAP's OCMM systems, this thesis will also detail the use of
OCMM's at Chrysler's Jefferson North Assembly Plant (JNAP). JNAP has been the most
successful OCMM installation at Chrysler and provides a very useful comparison to
WTAP. Also, because JNAP has made significant advances in their use of OCMMs,
JNAP can serve as a blueprint for the improvement of OCMM use at WTAP. Therefore,
in addition to providing data for a set of best practices, analysis of JNAP will also help to
illustrate where and how WTAP must improve.
The objectives of this research are twofold. First, by developing a common
understanding of the things gone wrong at WTAP, this research will provide a learning
opportunity for those at WTAP and at Chrysler. The problems plaguing OCMM
implementation at WTAP are in no way representative of the current state of
manufacturing Chrysler or WTAP. However, these problems do serve as a reminder of
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what can happen when equipment acquisition and implementation is ineffective. Second,
this research will provide recommendations to assist the men and women of WTAP in the
effort to improve their use of these systems. As I conclude my involvement with this
project, plans are being made for the mechanical improvement of these stations based on
the mechanical problems detailed in this thesis. These plans, if implemented, should help
to eliminate many of the current technical problems that have prevented the systems at
WTAP from functioning properly. However, these mechanical enhancements are only a
small part of the commitment and change that will be necessary to fully utilize these
systems.
1.2 Motivation for This Research
The primary motivation for this project is the need to maintain quality and productivity
improvements at WTAP. Therefore, this project is an attempt to provide continuous
quality improvements to WTAP through the improved utilization of WTAP's OCMM
systems. WTAP has made a significant financial investment in these systems (several
millions dollars in manpower and equipment) and is currently not leveraging the large
opportunity for quality improvement that these systems provide. Better OCMM use at
WTAP will assist in the reduction of BIW variation, early detection of BIW scrap, and
improvement of process up-time. Together, these benefits will result in increased
customer satisfaction and reduced manufacturing cost. Better OCMM use will also
provide better utilization of the "2mm Program" team at WTAP whose primary function
is to use OCMM data in order to reduce variation. This project, which focuses on the
improvement of OCMM use, is therefore necessary and appropriate in order to improve
productivity and quality at WTAP.
The problems associated with these systems are also important because the impact of the
successful use of these systems expands far beyond the data that can be retrieved from the
stations. The analysis of the problems with OCMMs at WTAP uncovers larger cultural
and organizational barriers that have a dramatic effect on the overall performance of
WTAP. In learning to use these systems, many of these barriers will simultaneously be
eliminated. Ultimately, one of the most powerful competitive advantages an organization
can have is a quality focused and participative workforce. Therefore, one of the greatest
benefits of this technology could come from using it as an impetus for cultural change in
the body shop.
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Finally, lessons learned and the recommendations resulting from this research can be
applied to most other technology purchases. Although the technology may differ, the
management of suppliers, coordination of users, and need for organizational change are
often the same. This paper will offer in-depth analysis of optical gauging equipment.
But the problems and issues that will be surfaced are in many cases just symptoms of the
deeper problems that afflict many manufacturing companies in the U.S. Technology
similar to OCMMs will continue to be developed and those manufacturers who can
quickly implement this technology will have a significant competitive advantage.
1.3 Intended Audience
There are several intended audiences for this thesis. First and foremost are the men and
women of WTAP who have struggled in their attempt to use these systems. The analysis
and recommendations contained in this thesis are directed primarily toward WTAP and
should assist WTAP in the improvement of their OCMM use.
Second is the broader Chrysler audience including other plants and engineering staffs that
must use or acquire this equipment. The lessons that can be learned from this example
can also be applied to many other plants within Chrysler that are facing similar problems.
And finally, students and academics studying equipment acquisition or cultural change in
manufacturing environments are the third audience. The problems that this thesis
addresses are in many ways symptomatic of the deeper issues confronting American
manufacturing and should help to deepen the readers' understanding of manufacturing
and manufacturing related issues.
1.4 Thesis Overview
This thesis is written to provide both the necessary background for readers not familiar
with optical gauging or Chrysler Corporation and the necessary details for those
individuals at Chrysler who will attempt to implement or use the information contained in
this thesis. Following is a chapter by chapter overview of the remainder of this thesis.
Chapter 2 serves as an overview chapter in order to introduce the reader to dimensional
control and optical gauging. This chapter will provide the background information
necessary to understand optical gauging's position within the broader dimensional control
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strategies of automotive companies. In addition, the chapter will explore the technical
foundations for OCMM accuracy and data use.
Chapter 3 discusses the specific OCMM systems and operating environments present at
Chrysler's Warren Truck Assembly Plant (WTAP) and Jefferson North Assembly Plant
(JNAP). In addition, a short benchmarking section will detail OCMM use at other
automotive companies.
Chapter 4 focuses on the implementation of OCMMs and provides an analysis of things
gone wrong at WTAP. Two areas, technical competency of OCMM systems and
equipment supplier relations, will be discussed in order to detail the existing problems
with OCMM use at WTAP and explain in part how these problems came to be.
Chapter 5 will examine how WTAP must learn and change in order to begin to
successfully use OCMMs. Specifically, this section will explore a concept called double-
loop learning and will attempt to provide WTAP with a path toward improvement.
Chapter 6 will present specific recommendations for improving OCMM use at WTAP
and equipment acquisition at Chrysler. This "plan" summarizes the analysis and
learnings contained in the body of this thesis.
A few final notes before you begin. In many cases, I have attempted to emphasize both
the weaknesses and strengths of WTAP in order to elicit a set of best practices. Because
these stations have not been used successfully for several years, however, many sections
in this paper emphasize weaknesses rather than strengths in order to best communicate
potential areas for improvement. This approach, however, should not mislead readers
into believing that WTAP is a troubled facility. To the contrary, WTAP is an excellent
manufacturing facility in many respects and their willingness to address these problems is
evidence of their desire to improve.
In addition, because this paper represents only a snapshot in time, it cannot effectively
detail the dynamic nature of improvement at Chrysler. As a result, it is important to
realize that at the time of publishing many of the problems raised in this paper have been
or are being addressed by WTAP and Chrysler.
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Ch. 2. Optical Gauging- A Generic Overview
In order to understand the complexities and potential problems with OCMM use, it is first
necessary to understand why OCMMs are needed and how OCMMs actually operate.
Therefore, this chapter will present necessary background information about OCMM
equipment in order to provide context for recommendations and issues in subsequent
chapters.
Beginning with an overview of dimensional control strategy and OCMM equipment, this
chapter will provide insight into the strategic level need for OCMMs and the technical
foundation of OCMM use. The themes initiated in this chapter will recur throughout this
paper and will help to provide both basis for the strong support of this equipment
throughout the U.S. automotive industry and an understanding of current implementation
problems with OCMMs.
2.1 Dimensional Control Strategy for Body-in-White Production
Because body-in-white (BIW) assemblies constitute the central vehicle base to which all
other vehicle components are attached, special attention must be paid to insuring BIW
dimensional accuracy. Variation created in the BIW assembly is often magnified
throughout the assembly process resulting in difficult down stream assembly and possible
problems with front-end alignment, engine installation, instrument panel fit, interior trim
fit, etc. Therefore, the central goal of most dimensional control strategies in automotive
assembly plants is to build high quality BIW assemblies.
In order to build a high quality BIW assembly, automobile manufacturers must focus on
one thing: building the BIW assembly to given design tolerances consistently. To
accomplish this, vehicle manufacturers must first design a manufacturing process that can
successfully assemble a vehicle to given design specifications and then insure that the
process can build the BIW assembly to tolerance consistently. This necessitates strong
coordination between product and process designers and an effective coordinate
measurement system in order to verify production quality. The remainder of this section
will focus on how product and process design must coordinate in order to successfully
establish an effective coordinate measurement system capable of providing useful
dimensional information. OCMMs, the focus of this paper, are one element of this
coordinate measurement system.
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2.1.1 Effective Product and Process Design
The design phase is most critical in determining dimensional accuracy and process
capability. Therefore, it goes without saying that significant time must be spent up front
to design products and processes that allow for the effective manufacture of vehicles.
However, time can be greatly reduced if product and process designers coordinate and
have in place effective requirements to insure a smooth transfer between product and
process design. In addition, these requirements must allow and facilitate the correction of
process and product designs based on actual production measurements. To accomplish
this there are several methods that can and should be used to insure that products and
processes are designed with the necessary flexibility to insure effective assembly.
One requirement that can significantly reduce the coordination time between product and
processes designers and speed the feedback of product or process design problems is the
use of well-defined critical interface points (CIPs). In many automotive companies, CIPs
are defined for each part or sub-assembly and serve as the critical dimensions that must
be held to the tightest tolerances in order to insure that all parts mate properly. If a
process can successfully manufacture these points to tight tolerances, the resulting
assemblies and products will be of high quality. Therefore, it is important that these
critical interface points be well-defined and that tooling and processes be designed so that
these points can be built to specification.
The accuracy of these CIPs also serves as an effective metric on the shop floor in order to
gauge process performance. With a measurement system in place, CIPs can be monitored
and product quality can be maintained and improved. In order to facilitate this step,
however, knowledge of process design must also be included in the analysis of CIP
accuracy. Therefore, another critical component of a dimensional control plan is the
inclusion of tooling locations and rest points that are used to locate CIPs during assembly.
Because tooling locations often have the largest impact on CIP accuracy, their inclusion
into a dimensional control plan is necessary in order to allow for the interpretation and
use of dimensional data.
For instance, if data indicates that a CIP is drifting on a door assembly, someone must
interpret the data and determine why the door is being assembled out of specification. To
do this, it is very helpful to have a map back to the process so that critical process steps
16
can be investigated. In addition, it is helpful to understand how product and process
design can impact the quality of the part. In the end the cause may be bad incoming
parts, poor part design, poor process design, or a process breakdown. However, the
ability to quickly investigate possible causes greatly simplifies root cause analysis and
enables quicker, more effective solutions.
Thus, the definition of CIPs combined with a clear understanding of the process design is
critical in order to provide a feedback map when actual CIPs are drifting. Together, these
two elements can provide a clearly defined path back to either the process or product
design so that improvements can be made. The next section discusses the development of
an effective measurement system within a plant that can help to monitor CIP quality,
detect possible CIP problems, and provide insight into why problems have occurred.
2.1.2 Development of an Effective Measurement System
Given a set of clearly defined measurement points (CIPs) for final assemblies and each
critical sub-assembly, an effective measurement process must then be established in order
to measure actual process output in order to verify and improve dimensional accuracy of
parts and sub-assemblies. To accomplish this a variety of equipment is available.
The three most common measurement devices are mechanical coordinate measurement
machines (CMMs), optical coordinate measurement machines (OCMMs), and check
fixtures. Because check fixtures are rapidly being replaced by CMMs and OCMMs, this
paper will not go into further detail about them. Thus, we are left with two primary
measurement devices, CMMs and OCMMs. In most cases, both are required due to the
dual desire of a plant to 1) measure process trends (i.e. be a process monitor) and 2)
measure detailed part geometries (i.e. be a product monitor).
OCMMs are used primarily for measuring trends in vehicle coordinates. Therefore,
OCMMs are considered to be a process monitor because these trends provide more
information about the process than they do about an individual part. OCMMs are ideally
suited for this job because they are located in-line (i.e. they are part of the process) and
they measure every vehicle on the line. This in-line capability is permissible due to the
fast OCMM cycle times (often less than 30 seconds) enabled by optical measurement.
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Mechanical CMMs are used primarily for measuring detailed part geometries. Therefore,
CMMs are considered to be product monitors because they accurately measure individual
part geometries. CMMs are ideally suited for this job because they have the accuracy and
the flexibility to measure a multitude of different points on different parts with only
simple program modifications. This is a great advantage when more detailed information
must be gathered about a specific part feature. In order to change a measurement point
on an OCMM, cameras must be re-aligned, coordinates must be recalculated, and all of
this must be done when the assembly line is stopped.
Recently, high speed mechanical CMMs (HSCMMs) have been placed in-line to combine
the benefits of OCMMs and tradition mechanical CMMs. Unless multiple HSCMMs are
located in parallel (which is a very expensive alternative), however, cycle times prevent
these systems from measuring 100% of production. Other new machines that combine
OCMM and mechanical CMM technology are also currently being developed and may
soon be a realistic alternative to OCMM and mechanical CMM systems.
Together, this equipment, providing the capability to measure both product and process
quality, comprises the essential ingredients of a measurement system for automotive
dimensional control. Currently, there is debate about the ideal combination of this
equipment for a given plant. At Chrysler, many plants have chosen to use OCMMs for
in-line inspection and CMMs for off-line inspection. However, other plants have decided
against OCMMs and have gone with all HSCMMs. Thus, there appears to be no uniform
strategy on the best mix of dimensional control equipment. However, some combination
of mechanical CMMs and OCMMs is probably ideal depending on the product mix at the
plant. Analysis of WTAP and JNAP will offer additional insight into this issue.
2.2 Optical Gauging Using OCMM Systems
First used in the 1960's, vision technology has expanded in the past several years into a
multi-billion dollar industry. Optical gauging, only a small segment of this industry, has
only recently seen wide scale use due to advances in processing speed and optics
technology. As applications and capabilities continue to increase, however, it appears
that optical gauging and OCMM use will continue to grow in the coming years.
Currently, Perceptron, Inc., founded in 1981, is the sole worldwide supplier of OCMM
systems to the automotive industry. Diffracto, Ltd. had been one of the early competitors
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in the OCMM business. However, in 1990, Perceptron became the sole supplier when it
purchased the portion of Diffracto's OCMM business specializing in the measurement of
BIW assemblies and stampings. Today, although there are some Diffracto systems still in
use, the majority of installations are Perceptron.
2.2.1 System Overview
An OCMM is essentially an assembly line station used to measure a set of specific points
(holes, edge points, or any corner points) on a stamped part or a BIW assembly (both
referred to as parts). The primary components of an OCMM system are the cameras
(used to measure the part), the camera support structure (used to position the cameras),
the system controller (used to calculate and display data), a conveyor system (used to
move the part in the station), and a lifter or other locating device (used to accurately
position the part in the station). Together, these components allow for the automated, in-
line measurement of stamped parts and BIW assemblies.
Cameras and camera
1l!Jr' ci C l' 1 tl lr ..
IE Vehicle
Tooling
E Lifter
Conveyor and carrier not shown
Figure 2. Cross-section of Typical OCMM Station with Mechanical Fixturing
The measurement process itself is fully automated and completed in less than 30 seconds.
Parts are typically moved into the OCMM station (by carrier or conveyor), located in the
station (by camera or lifters), measured by the OCMM, and released from the station. In
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the mechanical fixturing system shown in Figure 2., a carrier would bring the vehicle into
the station, a hydraulic lifter would lift the body off the carrier in order to locate the body
on the lifter tooling, then the OCMM cameras would measure the vehicle, and finally the
lifter would lower and the carrier would move the vehicle from the station.
Figure 3. Measurement Points for Cab Sub-assembly
2.2.2 Relative Coordinate Frames and Tolerance Chains
As with all coordinate measurement devices, total system accuracy for OCMMs is
dependent on the accurate translation of the relative coordinate frames located in the
measurement system. Therefore, this section will go into some detail about the
coordinate reference frames and associated tolerance chains within a typical OCMM
station in order to describe the key interfaces that must be maintained in an accurate
system. These concepts will provide a basis for the discussion of test results and analysis
of supplier and organizational responsibilities for these systems discussed later in this
paper.
As an example of how coordinate reference frames affect the overall system accuracy of
OCMMs consider the measurement of a particular point on a vehicle body. In order to
relate that point to other points on the vehicle the measured point must be located relative
to the coordinate frame of the vehicle which is defined during vehicle design. Therefore,
the coordinates of each measurement point must be translated through all of the relative
frames in the coordinate measurement system until a mathematical relationship is
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established between the measured point and the base vehicle frame. Any errors that are
introduced into this mathematical relationship will result in inaccuracies in the
measurement system. To understand how and where inaccuracies can occur we must
look more closely at the relative coordinate frames within a OCMM system.
Figure 4. shows the location of the relative coordinate frames for an OCMM system.
Again suppose a particular point on the vehicle needs to be measured (Point A). In this
case we would want to determine the translation between Point A and the base vehicle
frame, B. This translation is defined as T(A,B). To determine T(A,B), each relative
frame (from A to I) must be translated.
Relevant Coordinate Frames:
A- Point to be measured
B- Base coordinate frame of vehicle
C- Point on vehicle at locating hole
D- Locating pin position
E- Top of lifter at tooling attachments
F- Base of lifter
G- Base of camera support
H- Camera location
I- Camera measurement
Figure 4. Relevant Coordinate Frames for OCMM Measurement
Thus the formulation would be:
T(A,B) = T(B,C) T(C,D) T(D,E) T(E,F) T(F,G) T(G,H) T(H,I) T(I,A)
This formulation says is that in order to determine the location of a point on the vehicle
using an OCMM camera, you must know:
the location of Point A relative to the camera view, T(I,A)
the location of the camera view relative to the camera, T(H,I)
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the location of the camera relative to the base of the camera support, T(G,H)
the location of the camera base relative to the lifter base, T(F, G)
the location of the upper lifter relative to the lifter base, T(E,F)
the location of the upper lifter relative to the tooling, T(D,E)
the location of the tooling relative to the vehicle Primary Location Points (PLPs), T(C,D)
the location of vehicle Primary Location Points (PLPs) to the base vehicle frame, T(B,C)
The difficulty of achieving this translation accurately can be investigated by analyzing the
tolerance chains that tie these reference frames together. Figure 5. is a simplified drawing
of the relative reference frames in an OCMM station and clearly shows the tolerance
chains between each reference point. The camera system and fixturing system links are
shaded to indicate their criticality to the overall tolerance chain.
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Figure 5. Tolerance Chain for OCMM Reference Frames
By investigating these tolerance chains, possible sources of error can be isolated and
investigated. For instance, errors due to the camera systems or fixturing systems (shaded
in picture) can be decomposed into their sub-components and root causes can be quickly
determined.
These links can also provide insight into the complexity of acquiring and operating these
systems successfully. In general, the more organizations that have responsibility for part
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of this chain, the more difficult it is to achieve system accuracy. Thus, the number of
organizations with responsibility for part of this chain becomes a useful metric to
evaluate the complexity of system acquisition or operation. During operations, this
would imply that having one group responsible for all chains would simplify operations
by reducing necessary communication and coordination. During equipment design and
acquisition, this would imply that having fewer suppliers or functional areas involved in
acquiring the system would improve the chances for a successful system.
Because the translation of these relative reference frames is critical to the total system
accuracy of an OCMM, OCMM manufacturers have developed effective ways to
determine translations. Perceptron, Inc. has developed a method called VeriStarT M in
which the translation between a point in space and the base coordinate frame of the
vehicle is calculated by computer. In this process, theodolites are used the calibrate the
OCMM cameras and locate them in reference to the coordinate frame of the vehicle. This
process attempts to resolve all of the relative reference frames by providing an absolute
reference path between the camera point and the vehicle body. This translation is then
used by the OCMM controller to automatically translate each measurement into the base
coordinate frame of the vehicle during regular use of the system.
These translations can breakdown however in a dynamic measurement system when
relative reference frames shift during use of the system. For example, if tooling moves or
becomes loose, the estimation of T(D,E) used by the OCMM controller is no longer
accurate and the overall system accuracy is reduced. The next two sections will focus on
the areas that are critical during dynamic measurement conditions, the camera and
fixturing systems.
2.2.3 Camera Systems
The camera systems comprise the tolerance links from frame G to frame A
(T(G,H)T(H,I)T(I,A)). Actual measurement takes place by a method called laser
triangulation in which a laser line is projected onto the surface to be measured and that
image is recorded by a light sensor attached to laser (see Figure 6.). Based on the
dimensions of the laser line, the location of the point with respect to the camera can be
determined, T(I,A). Then based on the translation equations, the point can be translated
into the base coordinate frame, T(A,B). The position and aim of the camera,
T(G,H)T(H,I), is adjusted by physically changing the position of the camera. Cameras
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are typically located between 200 millimeters and 800 millimeters from the measurement
surface (newer technology continues to increase this distance) and are affixed to the rigid
housing that encloses the OCMM station.
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Figure 6. Optical Measurement of a Corner Point3
Error in the camera systems can be introduced by a variety of causes that include bad
lighting, surface contaminants on the vehicle, lens contaminants, gross vehicle mis-
position, misalignment of the camera, or mathematical estimates used by the computer
software. In most cases, effective routine maintenance (to include cleaning of cameras,
tightening of camera fixtures, adjustment of camera exposure, etc.) and careful set-up (to
include VeriStaringT M , camera placement, lighting, etc.) can greatly reduce the
occurrence of these errors.
2.2.4 Fixturing Systems
The fixturing system comprises the tolerance links from frame C to frame F and is
typically the most critical component of the measurement process. The role of the
fixturing system is to locate the part in the OCMM station so that the base coordinate
frame of the vehicle, frame B, can be located relative to base of the lifter, frame F.
3 Picture copied from Perceptron sales brochure.
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Fixturing is a dynamic process and can be cause for position inaccuracies that can
introduce error into the reference frame calculations done during VeriStaringTM .
There are two primary methods for locating the body in the OCMM station: visual
fixturing and mechanical fixturing. In both of these cases the body is usually positioned
using a 3-2-1 locating scheme (depending in the rigidity of the vehicle body) in which all
axis of rotation and translation are restricted. Because of their relevance to WTAP's
OCMM problems, I will go into these two methods in more detail.
In visual fixturing, the body is mechanically rough located in the OCMM (to within
10mm) and cameras are used to measure the PLP points on the underside of the vehicle in
order to locate the base reference frame of the vehicle. In mechanical fixturing, pins and
pads are used to locate the body. These pins and pads are generally located on a lifting
mechanism that moves the pins into place. In some cases, the body can be also be
lowered onto the tooling.
The biggest advantage of visual fixturing is that it can effectively eliminate potential
downtime problems with carriers, lifters, and tooling. Because the part can be rough
located, complex tooling and the need for tooling maintenance are eliminated. Thus,
visual fixturing can dramatically reduce the involvement of the skilled trades in the
operation of the station. This is a significant benefit in older plants, like WTAP, with
traditional work rules.
Visual fixturing also has several disadvantages when compared to mechanical fixturing.
First, visual fixturing does not locate the body similar to most other production stations.
Typically there are few clamps or pins in visual fixturing stations and therefore it is very
difficult to apply learnings about repeatability problems in the OCMM station to other
processes in the body shop that use clamps and pins. Second, visual fixturing requires
that cameras are fully orthogonal to measurement surface (i.e. directly below PLP holes).
This often necessitates the re-design of station tooling to allow for camera placement and
could be cause for contamination problems. Third, visual fixturing still requires that the
body be located within a 5-10mm tolerance. If the carrier alone cannot guarantee this, a
lifter or other location device would be needed.
Throughout Chrysler and General Motors, mechanical fixturing is the preferred method
for locating BIW assemblies. However, Ford has recently switched to visual fixturing for
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its new systems. Thus, both systems have proven effective in actual use and opinions
differ as to which method is most effective. At WTAP, visual fixturing is a very viable
option that could have major benefits over mechanical fixturing given the current
problems WTAP is facing. These problems will be addressed later in this paper.
2.2.5 Using OCMM Data to Improve Product Cost and Quality
The real value of any measurement device is only leveraged when the data are used
correctly to improve the quality and cost of the final product. Therefore, significant effort
is required to use OCMM data effectively. As shown, insuring the accurate recovery of
OCMM data can be complicated and difficult. However, analyzing that data and making
significant improvements to the product or process is even more difficult. Therefore, it is
not surprising that this is the area where most OCMM users have been most ineffective.
Today, with fast and highly sophisticated measurement devices, most plants have more
data than they could possible act on. However, without an effective method for tracking
part data back to the process, much of this data is unusable. OCMM data simplifies this
tracking process by detailing the dynamic nature of process changes. Therefore, to be
most effective, OCMM data must be used for real-time detection of problems and for
detailed analysis of process changes. This has required that new analysis methods be
developed to fully utilize this capability.
Real-time use (i.e. signaling defective part by alarms)
Real time defect detection is most valuable when used as tool to inspect for defects,
detect scrap, and alert operators that the system is out of control and needs attention.
OCMM controllers provide the ability to definme tolerance limits for all measurement
points. Knowing where and how to set the critical tolerance limits of specific dimensions
in order to insure that only defective assemblies are flagged is a very difficult and
requires intimate vehicle knowledge. When done properly, however, points that are out
of specification can be flagged and workers can be alerted to problems when they occur.
Without OCMMs, problems are often not detected until the end of the body shop or in
some cases until the product is completely built.
A good example of real time detection would be the measurement of windshield
openings. Because proper windshield opens are not visibly detectable in the body shop,
problems are often only detected during the actual installation of the windshield. This
26
results in high rework and scrap costs. However, by detecting and solving these
problems at the OCMM station, significant time and money can be saved. Other
examples of problems that could be identified early would include broken clamps, loose
or broken locating pins, and bad incoming parts.
Analysis
The central goal of OCMM data analysis is variation reduction. Therefore, analysis of
OCMM data is a far more complex and time consuming process than the real time use of
the data. The basic approach to OCMM data analysis has been designed by the "2mm
Program" based on their experience with several plants. Basically, the "2mm Program"
prefers a case study approach in which detailed investigations of variation causes are
detailed and solutions are documented. The general methodology for improvement of
variation is shown in Figure 7.
Figure 7. "2mm Program" Variation Reduction Methodology4
These case studies use a team-based approach to systematically determine the root causes
of variation and ultimately to find solutions to those root causes. During this phase,
effective product and process design is critical in reducing the difficulty of tracking and
eliminating variation causes. A team-based approach is necessary because effective
4 Diagram created from "2mm Program" literature.
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analysis requires process, product, and statistical knowledge that can seldom be found in
one individual. Once several of these cases are completed, a knowledge base can be
created that will greatly reduce the analysis time for many subsequent problems. The
results of this type of analysis can have many broad reaching effects as detailed below.
First, assembly variation can be measured and reduced. Variation reduction, which
focuses primarily on part to part variation of stampings and BIW assemblies, has always
been an important goal of automotive assemblers because of its impact on quality and
customer satisfaction. However, only since the invention of OCMMs have assemblers
had the necessary data to effectively understand and eliminate variation. OCMMs are the
ideal tool for measuring and reducing variation because of their high sample sizes and
their ability to provide data about process trends and mean shifts that no other measuring
equipment can provide.
To measure variation of an automobile, large sample sizes are collected and used to
determine the 6-sigma variation for all critical points. For each critical point, 99.74% of
the vehicles measured would fall within that 6-sigma value. Once individual point
variation is determined, overall vehicle variation is calculated by rank ordering the
variation of each measurement point and selecting the variation of the 95th percentile
point. Typically, a total BIW variation of less than 2mm2 is considered world-class.
Variation within automotive assemblies can be caused by incoming part quality, product
design, process design, and maintenance of the process. This variety of sources makes
the determination and elimination of variation very difficult. Typically, OCMM data is
recovered at or near the end of the BIW assembly process. Thus, OCMM data can show
that there is a need to reduce variation at a specific point on an assembly. However,
because it cannot show where the variation is coming from, tracking and root cause
analysis can be very difficult. A well-defined measurement process in which CIPs and
process tooling locations are well defined can ease this process. However, ultimately
effective solutions still require highly skilled people with an understanding of product,
process, and statistics. Several studies are currently ongoing to improve and simplify the
data utilization process (e.g. The Process Navigator5). At this time, however, there is no
substitute for experience.
5 Presented at "2mm Program" Workshop, Auburn Hills,- MI, Nov. 2, 1994.
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OCMMs can also assist in the improvement of process up-time by enabling the detection
of negative trends before catastrophic failure occurs to tooling and providing data and
trending necessary for the establishment of an improved preventative maintenance (PM)
program. OCMM data can be used as a predictive measure (i.e. the tooling can be
replaced when the data trends indicate wear or looseness) or as a schedule for
preventative maintenance (i.e. wear trends could be used to determine an effective PM
schedule). Ultimately, the early detection of possible tooling failures and the
implementation of an effective PM program will significantly improve process up-time
which will lead to increased productivity, decreased overtime costs, and longer
equipment life.
Finally, the skill development and empowerment of skilled trades workers on the floor to
analyze data and make process improvements can have dramatic effects on the long-term
competitiveness of the plant.
Together these capabilities make OCMMs an effective tool for reducing variation,
eliminating scrap, and improving process up-time. It is important to realize, however,
that because OCMMs are only an enabling technology, the quality impact of these
systems is largely dependent on how the data are used. Although methods are under
investigation to further automate the data utilization process, ultimately process
improvements are the result of hard work by skilled individuals.
Chapter Two Conclusions
This section helps to point out three important points about OCMM technology and its
use. First, effective OCMM use requires effective measurement system design and a path
back to product and process design. OCMMs must be part of a larger dimensional
control strategy and a path must exist between the measured data and product and process
design in order to facilitate quality improvements. Second, accuracy of OCMM systems
depends on the successful translation of coordinate frames within the systems. Therefore,
these frames and the tolerance chains that connect them must be maintained effectively in
order to insure system accuracy. Third, OCMM technology is here and can have a
tremendous impact on cost and quality if used properly. Therefore, manufacturers must
learn to use this technology in order to remain competitive in the future. OCMM data has
enabled a dramatic increase in wide spread research of variation causes and implications.
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This, together with the learnings of automotive manufacturers around the globe, is sure to
have a large impact on process and product design in the years to come.
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3.0 Optical Gauging at Chrysler Corporation
This chapter will provide a brief analysis of the history, organization, and use of OCMMs
at Warren Truck Assembly Plant (WTAP) and Jefferson North Assembly Plant (JNAP).
Analysis of WTAP will highlight the inherent barriers to OCMM use that are present due
to WTAP's process complexity, work rules, organizational structure, and OCMM design.
Whereas, analysis of JNAP will highlight the inherent advantages that have facilitated
JNAP's success with OCMMs. These two sites give clear evidence of the impact of
effective organizational and technological design on the success of OCMM systems.
This chapter will conclude with a brief benchmarking section in order to provide some
insight into OCMM use at other automotive manufacturers.
3.1 Introduction to Warren Truck Assembly Plant (WTAP)
WTAP's ineffective use of OCMMs has been due in large part to the organizational and
technological complexities at the plant. This section will detail many of those
complexities by providing background information about WTAP and their use of optical
gauging.
3.1.1 Product and History
WTAP, located in Warren, Michigan near the border of Detroit, has been building trucks
since 1938 and is very typical of most older U.S. automotive plants. WTAP employs
about 3,000 employees during two production shifts and is known for its aging and high
seniority work force. Currently WTAP is home to the Dodge Ram pick-up truck
(standard cab only) and the Dodge Dakota pick-up truck (standard and extended cab).
The Ram accounts for about 75% of total production and the plant runs at an average line
speed of about 72 jobs/hour.
As is typical of most assembly plants, WTAP is divided into three primary manufacturing
centers- body shop, paint shop, and general assembly (also called trim, chassis, final).
Because the primary focus of OCMM use is in the body shop, the remainder of this paper
will focus on activities in the body shop.
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3.1.2 The Body Shop at WTAP
Figure 8. visually depicts the process flow in WTAP's body shop. The two primary
outputs of the body shop are the cab assembly, which is built in two stages, and the box
assembly. Both the boxes and cabs are built separately and then mated before entering
the paint shop. During the basic production sequence, the cabs and boxes are first built-
up, then framed, and finally re-spotted. In the build-up phase, components are loosely
assembled to form complete assemblies. In the framer, these assemblies are locked into
position and welded in a few critical positions (less than a hundred) in order to insure
dimension stability. Finally, the assembly goes through an automated re-spot (ARS) line
in which additional welds (several hundred or thousand) are added for strength and
stability. The OCMMs at WTAP are located at the end of these ARS lines.
In Figure 8., the parallel and sequential nature of the assembly process at WTAP is
depicted. This series of dedicated and flexible assembly stages is necessary due to the
three different vehicle models that WTAP produces (three different cabs- Ram, Dakota,
and Dakota Extended; four different boxes- Ram 6ft., Ram 8ft., Dakota 6ft., and Dakota
8ft.). Although not readily apparent from this simple diagram, the body shop at WTAP is
one of the most complex (in terms of tooling and conveyor sequencing) and flexible body
shops in the world due to the multiple models produced. However, this flexibility has its
drawbacks because:
* tooling must be designed to accommodate multiple models and options
* on dedicated operations like framing, vehicles must be separated and then re-sequenced
* cabs and boxes are built separately and must be merged in sequence near the end of the
body shop.
Not only does this complexity make process design more complicated, but it also
significantly increases the difficulty of isolating and understanding process and product
problems. And because this is the central goal of variation reduction, analysis of OCMM
data at WTAP can be extremely difficult.
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Currently, WTAP has one of the most extensive and expensive arrangements of
dimensional control devices within Chrysler. WTAP has three OCMM stations to
measure underbodies, cabs, and boxes; one in-line HSCMM to measure the flush and gap
of cabs and boxes at the end of body shop; two off-line dual arm CMMs; and one off-line
single arm CMM to measure cabs and component assemblies.
WTAP's three Perceptron OCMM gauging stations are shown in Figure 8. The three
stations are each located at the end of ARS lines and provide the capability to measure the
complete underbody assembly, the complete cab assembly, and the complete box
assembly. Because the cab station (located on ARS2) was the only functional station
during my research, the remainder of this paper will focus on the cab station.
Fortunately, because the other OCMM stations are identical in nearly every aspect, all
learnings from the cab station can be directly applied to the box and underbody stations.
The cab station is used to measure three cab styles (Ram, Dakota, Dakota Extended). The
cab station uses mechanical fixturing and therefore relies on a hydraulic lifter to lift the
body and pneumatic clamps to properly lock the body down to the lifter tooling. Because
of the three body styles, the cab station has seven locator pins, eight surface locators, and
ten clamps. This makes the tooling in this station some of the most complex in the plant
and with this complexity comes the increased likelihood of tooling problems. The box
and underbody stations also use mechanical fixturing and are similarly complex.
Figure 9. shows the layout of the ARS2 line (i.e. the cab re-spot line). The ARS2 line is
composed of 28 welding robots used to spot weld the cab assemblies. At the end of the
ARS2 line is the OCMM. The central control panel for the ARS2 line is located above
station 01 and is used by two W&R technicians to operate the conveyors, lifters and
robots. This diagram points out two significant features of the ARS lines at WTAP.
First, access to the OCMM is difficult because of its location on the ARS2 line. All ARS
stations must be stopped before access is allowed and even then, the oily and expansive
welding pit must be traversed in order to access the lifter or cameras. Second, the
OCMM station is located far from the control panel, thus making routine maintenance
and inspection inconvenient for those running the line.
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Figure 9. Automated Re-Spot Line #2 (ARS2)
In total, WTAP probably has more data gathering capability than they would ever be able
to use. However, the key to dimensional control is not in gathering data, it is in using
data to improve the process. And without OCMM data that can specifically track the
process, process changes and adjustments are difficult to track. One reason for this
difficulty is the complexity of the process at WTAP. However, the remainder of this
section will discuss two other reasons- the complex work rules at WTAP and the
centralized organizational structure at WTAP.
3.1.3 Work Rules
Work rules play a very important role in the utilization of OCMM equipment. The
complexity of OCMM stations at WTAP necessitates that multiple disciplines are
required to operate and maintain them. In a plant like WTAP that has highly specialized
skilled trades, this also necessitates that many groups be involved in the repair and
upkeep of these systems and that communication between these groups be effective.
When this is not the case, system integrity can be compromised.
WTAP remains one of Chrysler's most traditional plants in terms of job classifications
and work rules. Within the body shop at WTAP, the following skilled trades have direct
involvement in OCMM maintenance and use.
toolmakers- In the skilled trades contract at WTAP, toolmakers are responsible for all
tooling that is not physically attached to a weld gun. Therefore, because OCMM
tooling is not attached to a welding gun, toolmakers are responsible for the build,
installation, and maintenance of all OCMM tooling.
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weld and repair (W&R)- The W&R have ownership of the ARS lines and are responsible
for the maintenance and up-time of those lines. Because OCMMs at WTAP are
located on ARS lines, the W&R control the day to day operation of the conveyor
and lifter for that station. If a tooling or electrical breakdown occurs in the
OCMM station, however, they cannot enter the station to fix it.
electricians- Electricians are primarily responsible for all electrical concerns in the
OCMM stations. This would include the programmable logic controller (PLC)
code used to control the ARS lines, proximity switches, and other electrical
concerns (i.e. wiring, conduit, etc.).
layout inspectors- Layout inspectors are in charge of maintaining and operating the
OCMM cameras and controller. These inspectors perform all station testing,
collect all data, and insure that the OCMM is collecting data at all times.
In addition to these, tooling engineers are required to oversee all shim moves (i.e. tooling
adjustments) in all stations. Two tooling engineers have responsibility for the entire body
shop.
The most profound work rules that affects OCMM use at WTAP are the rules governing
the W&R workers. At WTAP, the W&R have ownership of the ARS lines (i.e. they
operate the lifters, repair the robots, change the weld tips, call for other trades if needed,
adjust tooling, etc.). However, because the W&R only have jurisdiction over stations
with welders (which the OCMM stations do not have), toolmakers and electricians must
perform all maintenance in the OCMM station. This means that if a tooling or electrical
problem occurs in the OCMM station, a toolmaker or electrician must be called in to
repair the station. While this help is being called, the entire line must be shut down.
However, because the OCMMs do not affect production and because response time is
generally very slow, the OCMM station is usually by-passed (i.e. turned off so that ARS
stations can operate) for significant periods of production before repairs are made. When
accumulated and allowed to persist, this downtime critically limits the effectiveness of
these stations.
These work rules also make quick repairs and long-lasting repairs to the OCMM station
difficult because of the need to coordinate the activities of the multiple trades. Also
because each group maintains only a small part of the system, no one group has total
responsibility for the entire system (see Figure 10.) from either an accuracy or operations
perspective. Referring back to the tolerance chain, this effectively splits up the tolerance
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chain and increases the need for communication and coordination. As a result, overall
system accuracy is often compromised.
Layout Inspectors
Toolmakers
D Weld & Repair
Conveyor and carrier not shown
Figure 10. System Ownership of OCMMs at WTAP
In the case of the in-line HSCMM located at the end of the body shop, system ownership
has been given to two dedicated layout inspectors who operate the HSCMM. As a result,
the system has functioned well with only limited downtime. This approach was possible
because the HSCMM was designed to operate on a spur line (explained in more detail
later) rather than on an ARS line and because the layout department was able to dedicate
two inspectors to the station.
3.1.4 Organizational Structure
Although attempts have been made to move to a more cross-functional organization,
WTAP remains a very functionally aligned. Below is a simplified organizational chart at
WTAP.
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Figure 11. Traditional Organization Chart at WTAP
Traditionally, the body shop and general assembly areas of the plant have been run by the
Production and Manufacturing Engineering managers. The paint shop has been
separately run because of its unique and highly specialized nature. Together, these three
managers have been in charge of all manufacturing operations and have been the central
leaders within the plant. This structure has the advantages of centralized maintenance
and production departments that can allow for better communication within the
departments and more centralized expertise. However, this structure is not advantageous
in the case of OCMM use.
The current structure poses several obstacles for OCMM equipment because of the
coordination between the production, layout, tooling, and maintenance departments that
is necessitated by work rules at the plant. The only person in the plant that has direct
authority over all of these departments is the plant manager. Therefore, many small
issues never get resolved between the departments and OCMM stations are often in a
state of neglect because of misaligned and conflicting goals between the departments.
Recently, WTAP has attempted to transition to a new, more decentralized structure in
which the Production and ME manager positions would be replaced by a body-in-white
(BIW) manager, and a Trim,Chassis,&Final Manager. This would allow each of these
managers to concentrate on specific areas of the plant and to have complete authority
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over production, maintenance, and quality within those areas. This new organization
would eliminate the involvement and coordination of both the Production and ME
managers in any decision that involved production, quality, and maintenance. Within the
assembly areas, however, this move has been delayed in part because of a lack of cross-
functional experience for the center managers. This alone might be a career development
issue that Chrysler needs to explore further.
3.1.5 OCMM Layout and Use
WTAP has been attempting to use OCMMs since 1988. Since that time, WTAP has had
three different optical gauging systems in-place, each having only moderate success.
WTAP has always faced accuracy problems and has never effectively used all three
stations at once.
Data collection and analysis has traditionally been done by the layout department. To
assist the layout department with variation reduction and analysis of OCMM data, WTAP
has contracted the assistance of a "2mm Program" team. To this date, however, their
effectiveness has been severely limited by the lack of OCMM data.
WTAP has made efforts to use OCMM data more effectively. However, these attempts
have all been largely unsuccessful. At one time, WTAP put in place an alarm system that
would stop the line if five successive defective assemblies were measured. This system
was activated in an attempt to increase awareness of these systems and demonstrate the
benefits of the system. Eventually, the program was stopped because it created excessive
commotion and had a negative effect on line downtime. The eventual failure of this
project was due in part to the lack of understanding about what dimensions to set alarms
for and where to set upper and lower control limits for those dimensions. Because
tolerances were set haphazardly, premature alarms were often signaled and the systems
credibility was decreased. The program was also doomed because of the poor
communication throughout body shop about how this program would work. Many of the
workers in the shop were not even informed of the program until the first alarm went off.
With their current systems, WTAP is still a long way from implementing an alarm-based
system. WTAP must first gain confidence in the use of the data by demonstrating
successful process improvements. In addition, WTAP must insure that all of the
operating groups within the body shop contribute to the design of this program.
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Whatever the time frame for these steps, however, this type of data use must be
implemented if WTAP is to fully utilize the benefits of these systems.
3.1.6 Summary of Barriers to OCMM Use at WTAP
Upon first glance, the biggest problems confronting WTAP and their use of OCMMs are:
* the communication and coordination required because of the work rules
* organizational structure which complicates communication
* the complexity of the body shop
These are significant barriers to overcome. In fact some of these barriers might need to
be eliminated before OCMMs can be used at WTAP. However, this does not tell the
whole story because, despite similar barriers, other plants have been able to effectively
use OCMMs. The next section describes a successful installation and offers an
explanation of the differences.
3.2 Introduction to Jefferson North Assembly Plant (JNAP)
JNAP is an example of the best possible environment for OCMM use. The traditional
barriers seen at WTAP have been eliminated and the body shop and organization at JNAP
have been designed in order to best utilize OCMMs. In order to simplify the comparison
between JNAP and WTAP, this section will focus only on those areas that are
significantly different at JNAP.
3.2.1 Product and History
JNAP, originally built in 1907 and completely rebuilt in 1992, has become the lead plant
in Chrysler's drive to improve quality and productivity at the plant level. After being
rebuilt in 1992, JNAP turned its focus toward worker teams, ergonomics, and process
improvements in order to make JNAP the benchmark for excellence in manufacturing at
Chrysler. Today, JNAP is home to the Jeep Grand Cherokee and can boast one the
highest quality vehicles in the sport utility class (i.e. relative to other similar vehicle such
as the Ford Explorer, Chevrolet Blazer, Nissan Pathfinder, etc.).
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The workers at JNAP have much the same history and experiences as those at WTAP.
The average age is around 51 years old and the average seniority is over 25 years. The
only major difference is that most JNAP workers faced layoffs during the rebuilding of
JNAP.
The body shop at JNAP is far less complex than WTAP because only one body style
must be built. In addition, Chrysler did extensive benchmarking studies before building
JNAP. The result is a environmentally and ergonomically friendly plant with state of the
art equipment and processes. WTAP still has processes initially installed over 15 years
ago.
3.2.2 Work Rules
Because JNAP has adopted a modem operating agreement (MOA) with the United Auto
Workers (UAW) union, work rules and job classifications have been dramatically
reduced. Within the body shop, the only skilled trades that interface with the OCMMs
are the electrical technicians. The electrical technician classification combines the duties
of traditional W&R and electrician classifications. These workers have complete
responsibility for the operation and use of the OCMM stations (including data collection,
maintenance, testing, etc.). To assist these workers, JNAP has assigned one full-time
electrical technician to specialize in the OCMM stations and to assist the other electrical
technicians in their use of the systems.
The flexible work rules greatly improve the operation of OCMMs at JNAP. Because
electrical technicians are solely responsible for the OCMM stations, communication to
other skilled trades is not required and repairs are made quickly. Therefore, the tolerance
chain can be managed by one group and overall system accuracy can be better
maintained. The flexible work rules also facilitate the immediate feedback of OCMM
data to the process. Because the electrical technicians read the data and make changes
(i.e. shim adjustments, changes in incoming material, etc.) based on the data, the
involvement of tooling engineers and layout workers is eliminated. Thus, data are used
much more efficiently.
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3.2.3 Organizational Structure
JNAP has a much more decentralized structure than WTAP with a BIW center manager
who has direct control over all BIW activities. Figure 12. gives a simplified version of
this organization using job titles similar to those at WTAP.
Figure 12. Simplified Organizational Structure at JNAP
This structure greatly increases the communication and coordination within the body
shop by decentralizing decision making. Therefore, in BIW areas that are impacted by
OCMM use such as production, maintenance, tooling, and quality, issues or concerns can
be quickly resolved by the BIW manager. Communication is also aided by the colocation
of all BIW offices in the center of the body shop which promotes and facilitates
communication and worker interaction within the body shop.
3.2.4 OCMM Layout and Use
JNAP maintains four optical gauging stations (body complete, underbody, and side
apertures- right and left). Physically, JNAP's stations are nearly identical to WTAP's with
three exceptions. First, JNAP has an overhead conveyor system with individual electric
motor drives for each carrier. This overhead carrier allows the carrier track to be
physically separate from the station. Second, JNAP's lifters and tooling are new and less
complex because they are designed for only one model. Third, JNAP's systems are
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located directly after the framing operation in order to allow for quick feedback to the
framing station. Because of the variation introduced in the ARS lines due to old
equipment at WTAP, WTAP located their OCMMs after the ARS lines. With JNAP's
new and highly accurate ARS lines, JNAP can get an accurate dimensional picture before
the ARS lines.
In addition to the work rule and organizational differences already mentioned, JNAP also
differs from WTAP in their use and maintenance of OCMM systems. First, JNAP has
dedicated one electrical technician to oversee only OCMM use and data analysis. This
person is responsible for the maintenance of all four OCMM stations and assists the
electrical technicians on the line in interpreting the data and maintaining the OCMM
equipment. Essentially, this person is a dedicated OCMM expert.
Second, at JNAP the line is stopped for any part with measurements outside of a pre-
determined tolerance. These tolerances are established based on experience and are
adjusted so that only critical defects are flagged. When the line stops, electrical
technicians must retrieve the data and investigate the defect. Based on this inspection a
determination is made as to the severity of the problem.
Third, two weekly meetings are held to analyze variation data. JNAP personnel from
layout and maintenance together with people from the "2mm Program" analyze the data
and look for process trends in order to detect problems and evaluate improvement efforts.
Negative trends that could cause a series of parts to be flagged are address by these
meetings along with daily analysis of the OCMM data so that a critical level is never
reached.
3.2.5 Keys to JNAP's OCMM Success
To summarize, the keys to JNAP's success with their use of OCMMs can mostly be
attributed to extensive planning for and commitment to OCMM use. Specific products of
this planning and commitment include:
* new equipment and process
* modem operating agreement
· dedicated manpower leading to the establishment of internal expertise
* efficient organizational design
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These keys are in stark contrast to the barriers present at WTAP and are strong evidence
of the need for change at WTAP before OCMMs can be used successfully.
3.3 Benchmarking Other OCMM Installations
As part of this research, I have performed a very limited benchmarking study in order to
assess the competitive position of Chrysler and also to learn about best practices for
OCMM use. Although this study is rather limited and only touches the surface of
OCMM use, it is useful in positioning Chrysler based on their OCMM use.
Ford Motor Company
I have visited two Ford plants. Ford is noted for their effective procurement of OCMMs.
At Ford, OCMMs are purchased through line builders. Therefore line builders can use
OCMMs to prove out the line and eliminate variation during start-up. In addition, line
builders take on systems responsibility for the OCMM stations which results in a smooth
hand-off to the plant. In terms of data collect and use, Ford does not significantly involve
hourly workers in data collection and analysis. This job is done primarily by engineers.
Ford has not had the advantage of participating in the "2mm Program".
General Motors Corporation
I have visited one GM plant. GM is noted for its intense use of data by engineers and
technicians. Like Ford, hourly involvement in data collection and use is very limited.
However, GM has been very effective at analyzing OCMM data and making process
improvements based on that data. General Motors has also been very active in the "2mm
Program".
Use in Asia
Nissan is one the few Japanese automakers to use OCMMs. Their IBAS system is a
combination build and frame station with an OCMM located after it. IBAS is unique,
however, because readings from the OCMM automatically adjust automated tooling
points. Hyundai and Toyota also make limited use of OCMM type systems in their
plants.
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Use in Europe
Major European manufacturers using OCMM systems include Adam Opel, BMW, Fiat,
Mercedes Benz, Saab, Volkswagen, and Volvo. Although the effectiveness of their use is
unknown. The continued OCMM sales growth in Europe seems to indicate a
commitment to continued OCMM use.
Chapter Three Conclusions
OCMM technology is being used throughout the automotive industry and will continue to
be used. The benefits of OCMM use are clear. Installations like WTAP must therefore
focus their efforts on overcoming many existing barriers to OCMM use if they hope to
remain competitive in the future. Analysis clearly shows that WTAP has several inherent
disadvantages to effective OCMM use when compared to JNAP. However, these
disadvantages cannot be used to justify the lack of OCMM use at WTAP. Rather, they
must either be removed by organizational change or circumvented by effective systems
design and implementation.
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Ch. 4. Implementation of Optical CMMs
The next two chapters will discussion three issues critical to the success or failure of
OCMM systems: system competency, supplier relations, and management practices. In
this chapter, the technical competency of OCMM systems and equipment supplier
relations will be analyzed in order to develop an understanding of the current status of
OCMMs at WTAP and background evidence of how this came about. The next chapter
will then analyze how WTAP can learn from the past in order to create a plan for the
continuous improvement of WTAP's OCMM use.
4.1 Technical Competence of OCMM Systems
This section begins with a discussion of the technical foundation of these systems in
order to detail the observable technical problems that have plagued the OCMMs at
WTAP. These problems, segmented into system repeatability and downtime, are well
documented and provide direct evidence of problems with these systems. This section
will also provide insight into possible improvements that can be made to the systems.
Because my initial focus at WTAP was to improve the repeatability and downtime
problems with the ARS2 station, I spent significant time on the floor trying to address
these problems so that reliable OCMM data could be gathered and used. Therefore, much
of the data in this chapter comes directly from my experience and observations on the
floor at WTAP.
4.1.1 System Repeatability
System repeatability of the OCMM station is defined as the ability of the system to
repeatably measure the same part consistently. Effectively, it is a measure of the
variation component created by the measurement system itself. Actual vehicle variation
measured during production is comprised of variation from the measurement system and
from the actual vehicle measured. Therefore, in order to have accurate and useful
production data, this measurement variation must be minimal. In other words, system
repeatability must be high.
System repeatability accounts for all variation created along the tolerance chain of the
measurement system. Referring to the reference frame and tolerance chain diagrams (see
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Figure 13. and Figure 14. ), system repeatability would be affected by changes in any of
the reference frames during the measurement of a vehicle. The most critical chains are
those that comprise the camera and fixturing systems.
Figure 13. Relative Coordinate Fran
Camera
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Relevant Coordinate Frames:
A- Point to be measured
B- Base coordinate frame of vehicle
C- Point on vehicle at locating hole
D- Locating pin position
E- Top of lifter at tooling attachments
F- Base of lifter
G- Base of camera support
H- Camera location
I- Camera measurement
nes in OCMM Station
B
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Figure 14. Tolerance Chain for OCMM Reference Frames
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System repeatability also takes on added importance because in most cases the primary
cause of variation in the OCMM station is also a primary cause of variation throughout
the body shop. This is true because of the similarity between station design and
maintenance procedures throughout the body shop. Therefore, if you understand and
eliminate variation in an OCMM station, variation causes can also be eliminated
throughout the assembly process. An example of this would be loose tooling. If tooling
is continually becoming loose in the gauge station and is causing high variation, it is very
likely that tooling is also becoming loose in other assembly stations that affect the build
variation directly. Therefore, if loose tooling is a problem in the OCMM, it should also
be checked in other assembly stations.
Repeatabilitv Testing
In order to verify system repeatability, static and dynamic tests are performed in order to
isolate the tolerance chains and insure total system accuracy. These tests eliminate part to
part variation by measuring the same part and provide information about the causes of
variation in the measurement process due to the fixturing and camera systems. It is also
important to note that these tests are generally performed when the ARS lines are shut
down. Therefore, vibration and contamination from other ARS stations does not affect
test results.
Static testing measures the variation in the measurement process due to the camera
systems. In a static test, the same part is positioned in the OCMM and is measured about
fifty times without being moved. This test effectively holds T(B,C), T(C,D), T(D,E),
T(E,F), and T(F,G) constant so that only the variation due to T(G,H), T(H,I) and T(I,A) is
measured. Thus, a static test isolates variation caused by the camera systems-
T(G,H)T(H,I)T(I,A). Typically, 6-sigma static variation of about .lmm 2 for 95% of the
measurement points is acceptable.
Dynamic testing measures the total variation in the measurement process due to all
possible causes. In a dynamic test, the same part is lifted, measured, and lowered fifty
times. This test measures the effect of all tolerance links. However, because
T(G,H)T(H,I)T(I,A) is now known from static testing and T(B,C)T(F,G) is considered
constant, T(C,D)T(D,E)T(E,F) can be isolated. Thus, dynamic testing in combination
with static testing can provide information about the repeatability of the fixturing system.
Dynamic testing can also provide data on the overall system accuracy because the raw
data from a dynamic test includes variation from all tolerance links. Therefore it is
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critical that dynamic test results are acceptable before data is used from the OCMM.
Typically, 6-sigma dynamic variation of about .25mm2 for 95% of the measurement
points is acceptable.
In order to further understand the variation caused by T(C,D)T(D,E)T(E,F), additional
cameras were added to the OCMM station to measure the location of reference frame E,
the upper lifter. By measuring the variation of that point, the lifter mechanism, T(E,F),
could be isolated from the tooling and tooling-body interface, T(C,D)T(D,E).
Below is an example of the 6-sigma test results for several measurement points taken
from a static and dynamic test. Other results are displayed in Appendix A.
Static Test Results Dynamic Test Results
SENSOR LEFT RIGHT SENSOR LIFER
37 I/O 0.00 0.00 LTFRT F/A 0.02
37 U/D 0.02 0.02 LTFRT I/O 0.04
SENSOR LEFT RIGHT SENSOR LIFTR 
371/0 1.04 1.00 LTFRT F/A 0.10
37 U/D 0.12 0.08 LTFRT I/O 0.04
Figure 15. Sample Static and Dynamic Test Data
In Figure 15., the 6-sigma results from six sensors are shown for a static and dynamic
test, four vehicle measurement points (37 I/O Right, 37 I/VO Left, 37 U/D Right, 37 U/D
Left) and two lifter column measurements (LTFRT F/A, LTFRT I/O). The static test
results in this example indicate that all camera systems are functioning well (6-sigma is
less than .lmm2 for all sensors). The dynamic test, however, indicates that sensors 37
I/O Left and 37 I/O Right are not repeatable because their 6-sigma variation is greater
than .25mm2. In this case, the causes for this high variation would have to be
investigated and eliminated before the measurements from these sensors could be relied
upon during production. The overall 6-sigma repeatability for these tests would be
calculated by rank ordering the individual sensor variations and choosing the variation of
the 95th percentile sensor.
Figure 16. is a summary of the dynamic and static testing that was completed at WTAP
from 6/30/94 to 8/18/94.
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Static and Dynamic Test Results for ARS2
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Figure 16. 6-Sigma Repeatability Tests for ARS2
Figure 16. shows the slow, yet steady, improvement of the dynamic repeatability for the
ARS2 station. However, it does not show the constant battle with station downtime and
tooling problems. Each time repeatability was improved, downtime or tooling problems
would eliminate any improvements that had been made. For instance, on 8/18/94
repeatability tests indicted that 6-sigma repeatability was .34mm2 - an acceptable
repeatability to start data analysis. However, two days later a locator pin broke and
repeatability was lost. By the time the pin was replaced, other tooling had come loose
and all previous advancements were lost.
The periodic success that was achieved throughout this work was primarily due to the
elimination of loose tooling in the OCMM station. After each test, the data were
analyzed and the tooling was inspected. In most cases, the poor results were directly
attributable to loose or broken tooling in the OCMM station. Ultimately, the effort to
maintain repeatability was abandoned due to system and organizational level problems
such as downtime (discussed in the next section) and tooling looseness.
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Root Cause Analysis for Repeatability
In order to gain a better understanding of the components of variation in the OCMM
station, further analysis had to be done on the components of variation. Loose tooling
was obviously one primary cause. But further analysis was required to determine the root
causes of the tooling variation and whether there were any other primary components to
the total system variation.
Static and dynamic test data together with actual production data was used to determine
the variation caused by the lifter, T(E,F). Actual production data was used to measure the
effects of actual production conditions (i.e. vibration and contamination from other ARS
stations) on the lifter columns when in the up position, reference point E. Analysis of this
data indicated the following (see Appendix A. for raw data):
First, the lifter mechanism was repeatable during dynamic testing using the same body.
With few exceptions, variation of the four lifter columns was less than .lmm2 for
dynamic tests indicating that the lifter was repeatable under testing conditions.
Second, the lifter mechanism was not repeatable during actual production with different
bodies. When production data was analyzed, the lifter repeatability soared to over
1.0mm2 .
Finally, the lifter mechanism's mean height was significantly different depending on body
style. Therefore, the positive stops used to lock in the lifter at the up position were not
effective.
Based on these results, it can be concluded that variation is caused both by the lifter, as
evidenced by the production data, and the tooling, as evidenced by the dynamic testing
data. Because the lifter was repeatable during dynamic testing, the poor results during
dynamic testing can only be attributable to the variation introduced by the tooling and
tooling-body interface, T(C,D)T(D,E). In addition, because the lifter variation was
extremely high during production, the lifter mechanism itself is also contributing to
variation during production, T(E,F).
Possible causes for the variation due to tooling and the tooling-body interface,
T(C,D)T(D,E), include:
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Loose tooling- Loose tooling affects T(D,E) by changing the location of Frame D.
Loose tooling can be caused by excessive vibration and shock due to the lifting
process. Misalignment of tooling and vehicle PLPs can also cause looseness in
tooling through excessive shock and vibration.
Worn tooling- Worn tooling also affects T(D,E) by changing the location of Frame D.
Worn tooling can be caused by misalignment of tooling and vehicle PLPs or
delayed tooling changes.
Mis-located tooling- Mis-located tooling again affects T(D,E) by changing the
location of Frame D. Mis-located tooling can be caused by tooling movement
and improper shimming during installation.
Vehicle body twist- Vehicle body twist affects T(C,D) by not allowing proper mating
between tooling and the part. PLP pins and clamps cannot accurately fixture the
vehicle body when twist exists. This twist is due to variation in the assembly
process.
Worn PLP locations on body- Worn PLP locations affect T(C,D) by not allowing
proper mating between tooling and the part. Worn PLP locations are caused by
excessive positioning in other stations.
In order to improve these causes, WTAP must focus on improving tooling maintenance,
the accuracy of the vehicle location when presented to the lifter, and the accuracy of PLP
locations on the vehicle.
Possible causes for the variation of the lifter mechanism, T(E,F), during production
include:
Worn or loose bearing columns- If worn, these columns cannot repeatably lift the
vehicle. Thus, reference frame E is not constant between different vehicles.
Vibration effects during lifting- Vibration during lifting may cause lifter wear or lifter
damage. Lifter repeatability would suffer as a result.
Vibration effects when measuring- Vibration occurring during vehicle measurement
may affect the position of the vehicle or the aim of the camera systems.
Worn or ineffective positive stops on lifter- These stops will prevent repeatability if
they do not provide consistent stop locations for different vehicle types.
In order to improve these causes, WTAP must consider mechanically isolating the lifter
from ARS production stations, improving the positive stops, and shortening and slowing
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the lifter stroke. By isolating the lifter from the ARS line, all vibration would be
eliminated as a possible cause of lifter variation.
This data leads to the final conclusion that although the lifter mechanism itself may not
be flawed, the design of the tooling, the physical attachment of the OCMM station to the
ARS line, and poor maintenance procedures prevent these stations from obtaining and
maintaining adequate repeatability. Current plans are attempting to address these issues
by moving the OCMMs off the ARS line and installing new lifter systems. In addition,
more effective maintenance policies are being established to insure sustained
repeatability.
4.1.2 Station Up-time
Station up-time, defined here as the percentage of production vehicles measured
(although not defined this way at WTAP: up-time as defined at WTAP assumes that the
OCMM is repeatable when running), is as critical as the dynamic repeatability of the
OCMM. The argument can be made that without repeatability, OCMM up-time is
irrelevant. However, without adequate up-time, repeatability cannot be improved or
maintained. Furthermore, without adequate up-time, the detection time for quality
problems is increased and inspection for defects cannot be relied upon.
As previously stated, one of my primary goals during this project was to improve the up-
time of the cab station. To accomplish this, I spent many hours on the ARS2 line
working with the Weld&Repair technicians in order to track downtime and determine
downtime causes. Despite these efforts, however, the cab station still only measured 55%
of the production vehicles that went through the OCMM between mid-June, 1994 and
September, 1994. Although this was an improvement over past performances, it is
woefully short of the up-time required to effectively use these systems. Following is an
analysis of the causes of most of this downtime.
Downtime Causes
The first step to reducing downtime is to determine its causes. These causes can then be
used to determine root causes and solutions. At WTAP, I witnessed the following
downtime causes during my work on the ARS2 line.
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The primary cause was the electrical system failures and faults. Because of the
complexity of the tooling and the multitude of moving parts, very often clamps and bad
proximity switches caused the station to stop the line. When this happened, the W&R
would typically by-pass the station and wait for repairs to be made at the end of the shift.
These faults were also occasionally caused by mis-located parts, misshapen parts, or
broken tooling that obstructed the path of the clamps.
These technical reasons for the downtime were compounded by the poor communication
of problems between the maintenance shifts and the slow response time to problems.
OCMM problems were rarely communicated by W&R technicians to supervision and
therefore when the downtime was realized by layout inspectors, no one remembered what
the problem was or when it occurred. The W&R do not maintain ownership of the
tooling or electrical systems in the OCMM stations and therefore did not feel obligated to
communicate OCMM problems. In many cases, there was a legitimate problem with the
station. However, often the problem was just a single occurrence that would stop the line
once but would not be a problem again. Because the W&R could not go into the station,
they would by-pass the station in order to prevent further downtime on the line. And
when problems were diagnosed, the repair time was often several days or even weeks
because production equipment had priority over OCMM problems.
To illustrate these points, I will offer an example concerning downtime caused by faulty
proximity switches. Proximity switches are used to signal to the PLC logic that the
station is ready, done, or in process. Proximity switches are often located on clamps and
movable pins in order to signal to the line that the pins and clamps are retracted before
the part is moved. Failure to do this would result in broken pins and clamps and damaged
vehicles. In learning about the operations of the ARS2 line, I realized that several
proximity switches were by-passed in the PLC logic because the proximity switches were
faulty. By by-passing the switches, faulty switches would not cause the line to stop.
Therefore, instead of fixing the switches, they were by-passed to keep the line running
until the switches got fixed. However, apparently no one ever knew that the switches
were broken because they were never fixed. When I notified maintenance of this
problem, it took over three weeks to get the problem fixed.
The reasons for downtime are clearly both technical and organizational. Until the recent
plans for the improvement of these systems, however, neither had been effectively
addressed by the plant or Chrysler engineering. With the latest plans for the mechanical
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enhancement of these stations, recommendations for separate PLC logic and a spur line
have been made to improve the up-time of these systems. Separate PLC logic will clearly
simplify the detection of station errors and should decrease downtime due to problem
diagnosis. However, the addition of a spur line has come under some controversy.
Spur vs. In-line
In order to address many of these downtime issues at WTAP, several suggestions have
been made to install the OCMM system on a spur line (a by-pass line) so that
maintenance can work on the station during production without causing downtime to the
ARS lines. This would minimize downtime of the OCMM stations by allowing
maintenance and tooling technicians to fix OCMM problems during production without
stopping the ARS lines. Thus, repairs could be made during production when more
technicians are available and the response time to OCMM problems would be greatly
reduced. The in-line HSCMM at WTAP is located on spur line (due to its high cycle
time) and as a result has performed very well with only limited downtime- little of which
was caused by tooling or lifter problems.
There are also several disadvantages to using a spur. First, a spur is costly and would
require additional floor space that may or may not be available for all ARS lines.
Second, a spur could promote excessive by-passing. By providing an easy mechanism
for by-passing the station, the spur might allow the W&R to by-pass the OCMM just as
they are currently doing. Finally, by using this by-pass capability, WTAP will lose the
ability to rely on 100% measurement for defects. This may be small price to pay now for
improved OCMM use. However, if these stations will eventually be used to flag all
defects in the future, 100% measurement (or as near as possible) will be required.
In the ideal case, these stations would be treated like production stations and the need for
a spur would be minimized. No other assembly plants that are successful in their use of
OCMMs use spurs. However, given the existing work rules and the value placed on these
systems by the organization at WTAP, I believe that these systems will have a continued
need for repair. Given this scenario, a spur would allow for the best utilization of
OCMM. If, however, up-time for the new system can be maintained and WTAP re-
negotiates work rules and station ownership, the spur could be eliminated. In this
scenario, there would be occasions when production would be stopped for OCMMs and
there could also be occasions when it is necessary to by-pass the station because of a
catastrophic failure.
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Additional Ideas to Improve Up-time
Although potentially expensive, there are also several other options that should be
considered in order to improve OCMM up-time. Visual fixturing, which was discussed
earlier, could effectively eliminate the downtime problems associated with the
complicated tooling with the added benefit of improving dynamic repeatability. In
addition, visual fixturing could eliminate the need for toolmakers and would give layout
ownership of all equipment needed to insure dynamic repeatability. Thus, the number of
organizations responsible for part of the tolerance chain would be reduced and
communication would likely be improved.
New carriers could eliminate many of the tooling problems by improving the accuracy of
the body presentation within the OCMM station. This would eliminate tool wear and
frequent tooling breakages in the OCMM station and in all other ARS stations.
Finally, new work rules that would facilitate the detection and elimination of OCMM
problems or dedicated manpower to track OCMM problems and serve as a system expert
would also significantly improve OCMM up-time.
4.2 Equipment Supplier Relations
The analysis of equipment supplier relations can give insight into why many of the
technical and organizational problems that exist at WTAP have been present since the
initial installation of this equipment. Therefore, this section discusses the relationship
between the supplier and buyer in an equipment purchase, specifically as it relates to
OCMMs. This relationship is critical in determining and solving the technical and
managerial problems in any equipment purchase because:
1) The relationship begins during the planning stages of equipment acquisition when
changes can be made inexpensively.
2) Both the user and supplier have unique needs, resources, and problem solving abilities
that must be communicated.
3) Suppliers' equipment must often be integrated with other new or existing equipment in
order for the system to function properly.
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There are two critical tasks that must be completed by the supplier and the original
equipment manufacturer (OEM) during an equipment purchase. First, the equipment
must be designed and installed so that it can function properly at the OEM site. This
requires that the equipment meets desired specifications and is integrated with other
equipment at the plant. Second, operators and key users must be trained to use the
equipment. If both of these tasks are completed successfully, it then becomes the
responsibility of the operations management to use and maintain the systems. In the case
of OCMMs at WTAP, neither of the tasks was completed successfully. As a result,
management at the plant was left to operate a non-capable system.
4.2.1 Equipment Specifications
The design and specification of equipment is often the most important aspect of the
planning that is required for successful purchases. Equipment specifications help lay the
ground work for how the system will function, how it will be used, and who will use it.
Therefore, it is critical that accurate specifications be determined and that those
specifications be met by the equipment suppliers.
System Responsibilitv
System responsibility is the responsibility for defining system level specifications and for
insuring that suppliers' equipment is capable of meeting those specifications when
integrated into the system. Ultimately, the success or failure of a system will depend on
whether or not system level specifications are met.
The acquisition of OCMM equipment generally involves coordination between the line
builder (Progressive Tool & Industries (PICO), Detroit Center Tool (DCT), etc.), the
OCMM manufacturer (Perceptron), and the OEM (Chrysler, Ford, etc.). In the case of
WTAP, the lifter system was already installed so no line builder was involved in the
acquisition of the OCMM system.
Figure 17. visually depicts the information flow and specification levels for OCMM
systems. At the highest level are the corporate goals that, for the automotive industry, are
to lower vehicle cost and increase vehicle quality. To accomplish these goals, strategic
level specifications (or goals) are written, one of which might be to reduce variation and
scrap. If OCMM systems are selected to accomplish this goal, then system level
specifications such as up-time capability for the system, accuracy of the data, and cycle
57
time of the system must be determined. These system level specifications then dictate
what the necessary component level specifications will be.
From the analysis of this diagram, several implications are apparent. First, the path
between corporate goals and equipment purchases must be clearly defined and
understood by an organization. An inconsistency in this path can lead to poorly designed
systems and misaligned goals within the organization. Second, there is a need for a top
level integrator to insure that higher level specs can be met by the selection of lower level
specs. At each level, the number of components expands and the need for control is
increased. Finally, an internal knowledge base is necessary to successfully manage at
each of these levels. Only through intimate knowledge of the workings of the lower
specifications can the higher level specifications be accomplished.
corporate goal:
lower cost,
higher quality vehicle
I strategic level specs:
variation and scrap
reduction
:[ system level specs:
system up-time
data accuracy
system cycle time
I component level specs:
camera repeatability
lifter repeatability
camera cycle time
lifter cycle time
dimensions
Lines of
Information Flow
Figure 17. Equipment Specification Levels for Perceptron Systems
Supplier relations play the most important role in the determination of system and
component level specs. Ultimately, the system level specs will determine the success of
the system. However, the determination of realistic system and component specs often
involves tremendous coordination and communication between suppliers and buyers.
Therefore, specification writing is very important as a communication tool so that
suppliers and buyers can work together to insure system success.
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Also important is the determination of who should be the system integrator (i.e. who
should have system responsibility). In most cases the buyer is in the best position
because they must use the system and are most concerned with the system level output.
In addition, the buyer has more at stake (before system level specs can be verified the
supplier has received 90% of the contract price whereas the OEM still does not have a
functioning system- see explanation of Phase I and Phase II buyoff in next section for
further details) and often needs organizational learning that comes from being the system
integrator.
However, in some cases the supplier is better suited to take on the role of system
integrator because of their experience and intimate understanding of their product and its
ideal surroundings. In addition, many OEMs no longer maintain centralized integrators.
Platform teams and multiple divisions often do not effectively communication best
practices. Therefore, an experienced supplier can act as the link between successive
installations. Also, many OEMs have very limited internal skill base. Lack of internal
experience with a new technology can force OEMs to rely on suppliers for system design.
And finally, in the attempt to become lean, many OEMs no longer have the manpower to
oversee these installation programs.
In either case, however, it is important to realize that effective communications must take
place between the supplier and the buyer. Because ultimately, no one knows the unique
needs of the OEM as well as the OEM and no one knows the unique services and
products of the supplier as well as the supplier.
Chrysler has traditionally relied heavily on its suppliers for their systems knowledge and
expertise so much so that Chrysler has lost much of its internal process knowledge and
must rely on vendors to provide adequate system specifications. As the low cost
producer of automobiles in America, Chrysler has been able to maintain its leanness by
working closely with vendors and by giving much of the systems level work to the
vendors. This works well when suppliers realize this responsibility is being given to
them. However, if the system responsibility is not clearly defined, the system success can
be compromised, as was the case with OCMMs at WTAP.
The Specification of OCMMs at WTAP
In the case of WTAP's latest installation of OCMM equipment, system responsibility was
never clearly defined and component level specifications were not met. The result was an
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installation where the supplier's equipment functioned well, but the overall system did not
function.
At Chrysler, the formal process of bidding and determining system and component level
specifications is initiated by the OEM with a bid package that defines the suppliers
requirements. Within that package, component level specifications are defined and the
scope of the project is detailed. Vendors then respond to the bid package with a quote
that contains costs and any additions or changes to the original bid package. After this
quote is received, additional clarification can be confirmed through meetings. During
installation, there are two buy-off phases. In the first buy-off phase, 90% of the quoted
price is due. Phase two buy-off occurs after complete installation of the system.
Because system accuracy has been the major cause of problems with the OCMM
installation at WTAP, the following analysis about specifications will focus on accuracy
specifications. There are two primary system metrics that can used to insure proper
OCMM system accuracy- correlation with CMM data and system repeatability.
In the WTAP installation, Chrysler's initial bid package specifically required correlation
of CMM data before phase II buyoff. However, it only required that component level
accuracy specifications be met by Perceptron equipment. Specifically, the bid stated that
"the contractor shall provide sensors with individual repeatability of .05 mm (3-sigma)
and accuracy of .05 mm" and that "magnitude of correlation (with CMM data) to be
within 1.0 mm for all measurements."6
In response, the Perceptron quote agreed to meet the sensor accuracy and even agreed to
meet a total system accuracy of .25 mm2 (6-sigma) if visual fixturing was used.
However, the quote did not guarantee CMM correlation because of the common
discrepancies in correlation procedure nor did it guarantee system repeatability if
mechanical fixturing was used. Perceptron, however, did agree to assist WTAP in
improving lifter performance if visual fixturing was not used.7
At the time that this quote was submitted, the decision to use mechanical fixturing had
not been made. Positioning accuracy had been continual problem for WTAP with their
older systems. However, after a successful dynamic test of one of the existing lifters at
6 Chrysler Bid Package to Perceptron, Inc.
7 Perceptron proposal for installation of OCMMs at WTAP, January 25, 1994.
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WTAP, the decision was made to go with mechanical fixturing. Thus, Perceptron was
freed from any system level requirements in the specification sheet and was able to fulfill
their component level accuracy requirements even though system accuracy was never
acceptable.
In any case, Chrysler must ultimately take responsibility for failure to set systems level
specifications in the first place and then for the failure of the system to meet system level
specifications. A major failure was the lack of focus on the system level metrics that
would ultimately insure system functioning. In the end, Chrysler incorrectly believed the
system level goals had been met. However, the lack of effective testing and up-front
planning led to a quick and incorrect judgment about the accuracy of the lifters.
Perceptron did not take an aggressive role in insuring that system level specifications
would be met by double checking the accuracy of the mechanical fixturing.
Contractually it was not their obligation nor was it within the realm of their expertise.
The case of OCMMs at WTAP is clearly not representative of most equipment purchases
at Chrysler or WTAP. However, it does provide a good example of what can go wrong
when system level specifications are not emphasized. To contrast this case, the
installation of the DEA HSCMM at WTAP is an excellent example of an effective
equipment acquisition at WTAP. In 1990, WTAP contracted DEA, a European supplier
of HSCMMs, to supply two mechanical CMMs to WTAP. Both of these CMMs
contained new technology for WTAP (one was in-line, one had flexible fixturing) and
were the first DEA machines to be installed in North America. Therefore, the stakes
were high for both Chrysler and DEA because the success of these stations would likely
determine whether or not future purchases would be made at Chrysler. One
representative example of how DEA worked with WTAP involved vibration testing that
needed to be done. DEA gave Chrysler detailed descriptions of vibration testing that
needed to be completed. After Chrysler completed those tests, DEA had an independent
testing agency re-perform the test (at DEA's cost) in order to verify the results. Even
though both tests indicated the same result, DEA's willingness to go beyond the call of
duty in this case and their commitment to up-front planning enabled the HSCMM
installation to overcome many barriers presently blocking effective OCMM use. The end
result was a successful system which has become a benchmark installation in North
America. This level of commitment and service is more typical of what Chrysler prefers
from its vendors. However, Chrysler must ultimately take responsibility for
communicating this need through the project specifications.
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JNAP, although using similar bidding techniques and a similar specification sheet, was
able to effectively involve suppliers early in the design process and was able to design
and implement a very effective system from the ground up. JNAP had the luxury of
designing the system from the ground-up and involving suppliers early. In addition, their
work rules and organizational design reduced the number of organizational interfaces that
had to be crossed.
Ford circumvents this problem by requiring that their line builders include OCMM
systems on all new lines. Thus, system responsibility is given to the line builder.
Chrysler has also begun this practice with the minivan platform. This process has proven
both beneficial to the line builders, who can measure their product with the OCMMs
before shipping it the plants, and to the OEM's who are relieved from taking system
responsibility for the OCMM systems. For new systems, this type acquisition will most
likely become the wave of the future for OCMM equipment.
4.2.2 Training and On-going Support
Similar to defining specifications, coordination and communication is required in
determining who should be trained, how much they should be trained, and what they
should be trained to do. The quality and extent of training is critical to the long-term
success of any technology purchase. In general, training is provided by the vendor in
accordance with what has traditionally been required at other sites.
To insure long term system success, training must be given to all levels- from
management to hourly. In addition, training must be adequate and thorough to insure that
operators and managers understand both the how to use the equipment and why the
equipment is being used. Therefore, it is essential that management allow time for
training and that they insure that the proper users are educated.
The original goal at WTAP was to duplicate the training program used at JNAP. Because
JNAP had been very effective in their implementation, it was hoped that similar training
would yield the same results. Few records exist on exactly who was trained and how
much training they received. However, it is fair to say that WTAP employees received
far less training than JNAP employees. In addition, knowledge transfer from the "2mm
Program" participants to the WTAP employees has been very limited due to the lack of
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available OCMM data. Without a full-functioning system or a dedicated OCMM expert,
WTAP simply could not leverage classroom training in order to sustain a steep learning
curve.
Other options were also available to WTAP and still are open. Because WTAP had
available internal expertise at JNAP, internal training would also have been very
valuable, perhaps more so than vendor training. However, none of this was ever done,
partially because of a lack of OCMM data. In the future, JNAP must become a training
ground for WTAP employees.
Chapter Four Conclusions
The existing OCMM stations at WTAP are currently incapable of reliably collecting and
analyzing vehicle data. In the last two chapters, two primary reasons have surfaced that
help to explain why this has happened. First, the organization at WTAP, with it's
functional design and complex work rules, has made necessary coordination and
accountability difficult to achieve. Second, a complex system design with mechanically
incapable systems has made effective data collection nearly impossible. Together, these
factors have led to the OCMM neglect at WTAP that has rendered WTAP's OCMM
systems ineffective. Research into the root causes of repeatability and system downtime
together with an analysis of the OCMM procurement at WTAP provides clear data to
validate these conclusions.
Given these findings, the next step is therefore to explore management's role in the use of
OCMMs at WTAP. According, the next chapter will discuss management's role in
improving OCMM use at WTAP by exploring how WTAP can learn from this situation,
improve the situation, and create a more effective work environment in which OCMMs
can operate effectively.
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Ch. 5. Learning How to Improve OCMM Use
There are many problems that have led to the poor utilization of OCMMs at WTAP. The
previous chapter explained some of these problems in detail. However, it did not explain
how to solve them. For that issue is ultimately up to the people at Chrysler and WTAP.
This chapter details a method for enabling the creation of effective solutions to these
problems and will focus on the organization at WTAP. These solutions must come from
the people at WTAP and their creation will signal a culture change that will enable
WTAP embrace change and adapt to changing market needs. Through a method called
double-loop learning, this chapter will provide a framework that will empower the people
at WTAP with the capacity to learn. With this capacity, WTAP will have the ability to
improve OCMM use and resolve future problems quickly and effectively.
By using OCMM systems as an example, the focus of this approach is in questioning why
problems with these OCMM systems were created in the first and why they have been
allowed to persist for so many years. These are issues and questions that have seldom
been asked at WTAP and may cause some discomfort because of their sensitivity.
However, these are difficult issues that must be understood and overcome if WTAP is to
learn from this experience and improve in the future. Creating a workforce that can
provoke these issues and effectively resolve them is the ultimate goal of double-loop
learning.
5.1 The Value of Organizational Analysis
One may ask what is the value in performing an organizational and cultural analysis.
Why would we want to stir up these complex and often embarrassing or threatening
issues. There are several reasons why such an analysis has merit. First, meaningful
change must ultimately come at the cultural and organizational level- below the facades
and outward behavior. The majority of problems that an organization faces on a day to
day basis are merely symptoms of the deeper organizational problems and until those
deeper problems are addressed, meaningful change will not occur. Second, before this
change can occur, it is necessary to understand culture and assumptions that people in the
culture are acting upon. Change must come about by working within cultural bounds and
slowly changing assumptions about how things work. Third, different and new
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perspectives bring insight to problems. Often only an outsider can help those intimately
involved in a situation to see the solution.
Ultimately a culture that embraces learning and can adapt to new and innovative
technology is in the best position to maintain long-term competitiveness. To do so,
organizations must strive to continuously learn from past experiences and they must have
a clear direction along the continuous path of change. This section will attempt to assist
WTAP in this learning process and in the establishment of just such a path.
In the specific case of WTAP, cultural and organizational change will be the essential
element to improving OCMM use. Effective OCMM use does require technically sound
equipment, an effective implementation plan, and a supportive infrastructure. However,
ultimately it is up to the people to bring about these conditions and to believe in the value
of these conditions. Therefore, the cultural change is central to the successful use of
OCMMs.
5.2 Double-Loop Learning- How to Improve
The traditional view of learning in most organizations is a single-loop process. An action
has some result and based on that result information is fed back and actions are modified
to produce intended results.
Figure 18. Single-Loop Learning8
Thus, single-loop learning solves the presenting problems. However, it does not help to
answer the question of why the problem existed in the first place. To better understand
this question, we need to develop the ability to use double-loop learning. In double-loop
learning, not only is the problem considered, but the factors that created the problem in
the first place are also considered. For instance, in his book "Overcoming Organizational
8 Argyris, Chris. Overcoming Organizational Defenses. Needham Heights, MA: Allyn and Bacon, 1990.
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Defenses", Chris Argyris uses the example of a CEO retreat held in order to improve
corporate-division relationships. In this example, the top level management at the retreat
worked diligently to determine the problems that they saw as leading to the poor
corporate-division relationships. Those problems included:
1. The philosophy and meaning of decentralization were not clear; corporate often
violated divisional space.
2. Corporate staff felt that they lacked adequate authority to deal with the line.
3. Overlapping responsibilities existed among corporate staff roles.
4. Corporate staff felt that they did not have adequate contact with the CEO.
To deal with the problems the CEO charged the line staff with (1) redefining the roles in
order to eliminate confusion, (2) defining adequate authority to deal with line, and (3)
defining appropriate contacts for line and staff with the CEO. The task force successfully
addressed these problems by re-writing the rules and policies of the corporate-staff
relationship and their recommendations were implemented with only minor alterations.
Thus, the presenting problems were solved.
What this approach failed to address, however, is why these problems existed in the first
place. Why did the corporate staff and divisional officers adhere to, implement, and
maintain these errors for so many years? These are the real issues that will continue to
prevent the new rules and policies from being effective. The answer lies in
organizational defenses and the inability to use double-loop learning.
Figure 19. Double-Loop Learning9
Double-loop learning focuses on re-evaluating governing values when a problem occurs.
It requires that an organization or individual not just solve a presenting problem, but
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rather seek to understand the fundamental values that are in conflict or leading to the
problem outcome. In the case of the CEO retreat, the real issues that eventually surfaced
were (1) divisional management's fear that corporate staff was making inroads on their
authority, (2) corporate staffs fear that they did not wish to use their expertise because it
would mean that divisional management were admitting weakness, and (3) both corporate
staff and divisional presidents' playing politics to get the CEO's attention. Only when
these issues were open for discussion could the real problems between corporate and
divisions be solved. However, in order to bring these issues into the open, organizations
must be skilled at double-loop learning and they must be in an environment that
encourages this type of learning.
This model explains why when organizations create new programs and policies to
address a problem, the same or slightly different problems often re-emerge to render the
new programs and policies just as ineffective as the ones they replaced. Often the most
difficult issues and assumptions that are at the very base of a problem are never discussed
or addressed in the open for fear of creating an uproar.
So how can an organization begin to use double-loop learning. Based on his experience
with many different organizations, Chris Argyris recommends the following steps in
order to empower an organization with the ability to learn:
1) Map out how the organization currently deals with such problems.
2) Help the individual players diagnose the extent to which each contributes to creating
and maintaining the map.
3) Reeducate the players to take double-loop learning from an espoused theory to a
theory-in-use.
4) Repeat the learning experience to solve new problems.
This is a simple plan for creating the ability to double-loop learn. However, it is an
incredible difficult methodology to implement that often requires professional assistance
in larger organizations. However, just an awareness on the part of key individuals within
an organization can be a step in the right direction.
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5.3 Applying Double Loop Learning to OCMM Use at WTAP
So how then can this model be applied to OCMM use at WTAP. It would be easy to
approach this from a single-loop perspective and simply determine and implement
solutions for all of the problems described in this thesis. With the right focus and
commitment, WTAP could probably do this in a few weeks or months. However, to
really solve these problems WTAP must first understand why and how these problems
were created. WTAP and Chrysler must ask why OCMM use at WTAP has been allowed
to be a problem for over five years.
The immediate response for those involved will probably be to point fingers and try to
escape blame. However, this is not an exercise in defining blame. Rather it must be an
exercise in which people first look to understand how they have contributed to the
problems that currently exist. Everyone at WTAP wants to solve the problems, why then
do these problems continue to exist? In examining this question with respect to OCMM
use, the people at WTAP will likely uncover many of the hidden problems that have
prevented success in many other projects. Many improvements have been attempted
without significant change. Now, only a change in governing values by everyone at
WTAP will allow real improvement to occur. Therefore, the challenge is to bring about
this change.
To achieve this change, the first requirement will be support and leadership from the top
level management at WTAP. This commitment can be pushed from the lower levels or
from higher levels but ultimately, those in charge at WTAP must become believers and
champions. Management must create an environment in which it is all right to openly
discuss problems and admit mistakes. Without this kind of environment, real learning
and communication is hindered.
In addition, external help will most likely be needed. WTAP can make many
improvement on their own. However, a trained facilitator not intimately involved can
dramatically speed the learning process. Chrysler has recently developed some of these
resources internally through the creation of the Chrysler Manufacturing College.
But this change in learning methodology is only the first step to improved OCMM use.
WTAP must also set in place a plan to begin implementation. The following sections
provides a framework and an initial starting point for just such a plan.
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5.4 Implementing OCMM Best Practices
Given this new way of problem solving, management at all levels must then take the
responsibility for promoting and facilitating the effective implementation of OCMM-
based technologies. Ultimately, managers at the plant level must lead the implementation
of new technology. Therefore, given the existing situation at WTAP, this section will
focus on the key steps for accomplishing effective implementation and for promoting the
changes that OCMM technology will necessitate.
Many past installations, like WTAP, have lacked an effective implementation strategy for
gaining worker support and developing organizational commitment. Therefore, this
section will attempt to provide insight into how this can be better accomplished and used
to improve WTAP's current use of OCMM systems.
(commitment and flexibility
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Figure 20. Conceptual Model of Change Process Needed for OCMM Improvement
As Figure 20. shows, the change process requires several key ingredients be present.
First, an organization must have a good understanding of current conditions and of what
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the future vision of the organization should be. Second, an organization must have a
clear transition plan for making that vision a reality. Third, to facilitate the
implementation and success of that plan, an appropriate infrastructure must be present.
Finally, external pressures that reinforce the need for change and demonstrate
commitment to change are critical. With these factors present, difficult change can be
accomplished.
The existing state of OCMM use at WTAP is well documented. Therefore I will explain
in more detail the other key ingredients to improving OCMM use at WTAP.
5.4.1 A Clear Vision
In-line measurement of 100% of vehicle bodies requires a shift in thinking and
management must be creative in order to fully utilize this capability. Therefore, a
comprehensive and thorough vision must be established that is understood by all key
users at WTAP and is aligned with Chrysler's long-term objectives to improve quality,
increase worker empowerment, and reduce overall manufacturing costs.
The goal of creating this vision is to effectively communicate how these systems will be
used and what benefit these systems will provide to the organization. This enables the
organization to develop a common understanding and direction so that the entire
organization can work toward a shared long-term vision.
The vision cannot be dictated however. It must be jointly created by those who will be
affected by it. Buy-in from and ownership by key systems users is critical to the long-
term success of these systems. Only through key user participation can this be
established.
To create this vision, WTAP must leverage its existing internal capabilities and also
explore what other sites have done with OCMM equipment. Extensive benchmarking,
some of which has already been completed, lays the foundation for what is possible.
However, only the people of WTAP can decide what direction is the best. Therefore, the
most critical question is what vision does WTAP seek to follow.
One possible vision is the operations at JNAP. WTAP is fortunate to have access to a
facility like JNAP that can effectively demonstrate the benefits of these systems and bring
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the long-term vision of WTAP into reality. Thus far, however, WTAP has not leveraged
the learnings and advances already made at JNAP. By focusing on JNAP's use of
OCMMs, WTAP can provide its workers with a concrete understanding of the goals of
this change program. However, in doing this WTAP must consider what is realistic.
Specifically, WTAP must consider the current organization limitations at WTAP and
determine which can be eliminated and which should be circumvented. WTAP has done
an very effective job of this with the DEA HSCMMs. OCMMs should be no different.
My strong belief is that WTAP should attempt to duplicate JNAP. However, this would
require work rule changes and organizational changes that would require significant time
and effort. WTAP would have to remain patient and committed.
5.4.2 A Plan to the Reach the Vision
WTAP must have in place a clear plan to accomplish their shared vision. This plan must
consider the talents, resources, and other special requirements of the plant and be
understood by all interested parties. Therefore, this plan must be created with input from
all interested parties and must clearly define responsibilities in the planning and
implementation process. The three pillars of that plan must include mechanical
improvements to the systems, training, and data usage.
The first step in the improvement of these systems must be the redesign of the current
mechanical configuration. Planning for this is already taking place. However, caution
must be taken to insure that this step is not completed until other strategic decisions are
made that might impact the mechanical design of the system.
The second step is the development of an effective training program that will assist the
key users of this technology. Training of both managers and floor workers should be
developed to eliminate current skill deficiencies so that a common understanding can be
reached. To accomplish this, WTAP should make use of the existing expertise and
resources available at JNAP.
The third and final step is the creation of an effective data utilization plan. This plan
must detail a clear value path that will show the link between data collection, process
improvements, and quality improvements. This plan should leverage existing resources
at WTAP ("2mm program", process experts, etc.) and create addition resources through
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cross training. Together, these resources will allow WTAP to effectively recover data
and make long lasting process improvements.
5.4.3 An Infrastructure to Facilitate Implementation of the Plan
A critical element to the above plan is the establishment of an infrastructure and
environment that can facilitate the implementation of a plan to improve OCMM use at
WTAP. Given the current culture and environment at WTAP, even a well conceived
implementation plan might fail if necessary infrastructures weren't present. By providing
an infrastructure that enables commitment from all levels of management and provides
accountability and support to the workers, an effective implementation plan can be
successful. To accomplish this, several factors must be present.
First, accountability must be given to those in charge of implementation. Key users and
those in charge of implementation must be held accountable for their results. To insure
this, implementation progress should be measured and charted. Once the systems are
operational, routine reports detailing system downtime, station repeatability, and overall
BIW variation should be published and monitored by management at the plant.
Second, resources must be made available to those in charge of implementation. If key
users and those in charge of implementation are to be held accountable for system
performance, then must also be given the authority to request needed resources.
Third, recognition must also be given to those in charge of implementation. As a major
change initiative, this project would require that recognition be given on a frequent basis
by management at the plant and on a more infrequent basis by top-level management
outside the plant (during tours or walk throughs). People need to know that their efforts
are beneficial and appreciated.
Fourth, the manpower must be made available that will enable a team-based approach.
OCMM data analysis requires the broad skills sets and expertise that are only achievable
in a multi-functional group. In addition, those that must use this data to make changes
must be involved in the analysis process. Even with the HSCMM data, this has typically
not been the case.
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Fifth, the existing work rules and organizational design must be modified to allow for
efficient OCMM use. Without these changes, communication and coordination
difficulties will continue to hinder OCMM use.
JNAP has been very effective at creating an environment that promotes the
implementation and use of OCMMs. To promote the importance of OCMMs, tours by
executives at JNAP often center on OCMM use, thus giving the operators recognition and
acknowledgment. In addition, dedicated manpower is used to oversee OCMM use,
weekly team meetings are held to analyze OCMM data, special assist devices have been
built to simplify defect detection, and frequent recognition by the center manager at
JNAP provides incentive for the electrical technicians.
5.4.4 Long-term Flexibility and Commitment
The pressure to continue this type of change must be applied through the commitment
and support of upper level management. Implementation of new technology requires
patience and often yields slow returns. However, cultural change and learning will
evolve over time given the right environment and patience. Therefore, management must
remain committed and must be flexible in their methodologies for facilitating change.
Increased priority and resources will be required to implement and complete a project of
this magnitude. Therefore, short-term pressure for financial results will only hinder the
efforts to create long-term change.
Chapter Five Conclusions
This section is purposefully short and insufficient in detail to really provide the necessary
information for WTAP to understand and begin to develop the capabilities of double-loop
learning. However, I hope that this brief introduction can spark some of the people to
investigate this topic further. There are several excellent books about this subject and
many outside resources that could help WTAP in the learning process1 0. However,
WTAP must take initiative for implementing a methodology that will promote learning
and enable long term competitiveness. OCMMs provide an ideal case study to begin
implementation of such a methodology.
10 See articles by Argyris and Schein in the reference section.
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Double-loop learning would only provide a framework for improving OCMM use at
WTAP. Therefore, WTAP must also focus on creating an effective implementation
strategy for OCMM use. WTAP must first confirm that this effort is worthwhile based
on the factual performance records of other plants that use OCMMs. Next, WTAP must
get input from all concerned parties and create a plan to begin implementation (this thesis
is the first attempt to do this). And finally, everyone at WTAP must commit to carrying
out the plan. WTAP has never developed a clear vision of how these systems would
operate. Promises have been broken, and the shop floor users haven't been listened to.
Therefore, the focus must be clear and mistakes must be minimized.
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Ch. 6. Summary Recommendations
This chapter summarizes many of the discussions and ideas contained in the body of this
thesis and provides specific recommendations for both WTAP and Chrysler. It is
unlikely that review of these recommendations will result in the dramatic improvement of
current challenges at WTAP and Chrysler. However, discussion and analysis of these
recommendations will help to establish greater understanding of these challenges and a
possible path for improvement.
6.1 Recommendations to WTAP About Their OCMM Use
Because the problems with OCMM use at WTAP have existed for such a long time, the
determination and implementation of solutions will require tremendous coordination and
cross-functional participation. Therefore, I have gathered input from a variety of sources
in order to develop these recommendation. Ultimately, however, the men and women of
WTAP must jointly develop their own solutions so that consensus and ownership in the
future plans are established. Therefore, these recommendations should be useful as a
guideline and initial starting point for establishing consensus and ownership at WTAP.
Based on my experience at WTAP, I believe that WTAP's OCMM systems are in need of
a step improvement, not an incremental improvement. Therefore, WTAP must decide
whether to continue to pursue the use of these systems with increased priority or whether
to remove the systems. Half-hearted attempts to the current OCMM systems will
continue to be ineffective. Given this, WTAP is faced with three options:
Option #1) Remove OCMM stations and install more in-line HSCMMs. WTAP has been
tremendously effective at using in-line HSCMMs and could gather enough data to
allow for variation reduction. The current OCMM systems could be removed and
distributed to other Chrysler facilities in need of cameras and fixturing. This,
however, would be a very costly option and might not promote data recovery and
analysis by the skilled trades in charge of production equipment.
Option #2) Upgrade current systems to circumvent existing organizational barriers.
Systems can be designed to eliminate current communications problems and
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minimize multiple ownership. Using visual fixturing and a spur line would be
examples of how to do this.
Option #3) Upgrade current systems and address existing organizational barriers.
OCMMs could be the impetus for a cultural change in the body shop that would
improve work rule restrictions, worker involvement in data recovery and analysis,
and quality awareness by all workers.
I believe that WTAP must commit to option #3. Strategically, Chrysler must view these
systems not only based on what benefits they can provide but also in the skills that they
can create within the workforce at WTAP. This creates a need to re-assess what skills
they hope to develop by using these systems. I feel that the most beneficial approach
would be to develop SPC skills and problems solving skills in the skilled trades workers.
Therefore, the JNAP model is an appropriate model to follow.
Before this model can be achieved, however, I feel that WTAP must develop the capacity
to use double-loop learning throughout the organization. WTAP must use this
opportunity to learn from past problems with OCMM use and eliminate those problems in
the future. With this foundation, WTAP must then:
1) Install competent mechanical systems- the current systems must be upgraded and
moved off the ARS lines
2) Establish ownership and accountability- a team approach is necessary due to required
skills. In addition, only through a team can accountability be given to one group.
3) Commit to stopping the line when necessary- WTAP will have to face some initial
decrease in production in order to promote and effectively combat variation and
defects.
4) Provide training and time for skill development- Skill development must be at the
cornerstone of OCMM use. Only through properly trained users can OCMM be
effectively maintained now and in the future.
5) Publicize results and reward workers- There must be recognition for the efforts of
those people on the floor that are willing to take up the challenge.
The end goal of these efforts are to create an organization in the body shop that is focused
on quality and has the skills necessary to problem solve and improve quality. OCMMs
would then become just one tool to facilitate this effort.
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6.2 Recommendations to Chrysler About Equipment Purchases
In order to be successful, WTAP must be provided with good product designs, capable
equipment, and technical support. Therefore, I make the following suggestions to
Chrysler:
Focus OCMM efforts within the confines of a well conceived top-down dimensional
control plan. Successful OCMM use is highly dependent on the ability to effectively
recover data, analyze data, and make improvements to product and process.
Therefore, it is critical that these activities be linked through the establishment of an
effective dimensional control plan that starts during design and facilitates data
analysis and subsequent improvement to product and process. Without clear links
between data and design, this process can be difficult and at times impossible.
Clearly identify system responsibility and focus on achieving system level specifications
during equipment purchases. Whether internal or external, system responsibility must
be clearly defined and communicated to all involved parties. In addition, system
specifications must become the focal point of equipment acquisition and the ultimate
determiner of system success. Extreme care must be taken to insure that component
level specifications will enable system level specifications to be met.
Strive toward common systems (organizational design, process technology, work rules,
etc.) at all manufacturing sites. Common systems facilitate knowledge transfer and
help to eliminate duplicate activities. This requires that Chrysler maintain an internal
knowledge base that can promote commonality among plants and can be leveraged by
plants when improvements are made. Chrysler has become lean and very cost
effective by outsourcing process technology. However, Chrysler must maintain
enough internal expertise to facilitate effective commonality in process design
between plants.
Consider projects from the perspective of the skills they will development in the
organization. Installations cannot be evaluated solely based on short-term financial
measures. Rather, justification must also be based on non-financial measurements
with longer-term pay backs such as skill development. Installations must also focus
on achieving these longer-term goals during initial design and acquisition.
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Promote and facilitate double-loop learning. Double loop-learning or a similar
methodology must become the backbone of a continuous improvement plan. To
accomplish this, training must be provided and an environment focused on learning
must be created.
Focus improvement efforts on shifting accountability and responsibility to the floor level.
Listen to key system users and provide the resources that they need. In return,
demand functionality and measurable improvement. Management must listen to the
needs of the floor and must insure that all decisions are effectively communicated and
explained to key users.
More than suggestions, these points serve as reminders of important points that facilitate
effective equipment design, acquisition, implementation, and use. Chrysler's market
success combined with their many outstanding manufacturing facilities is clear evidence
that these suggestions have been and will continue to be a focus of Chrysler's continuous
improvement efforts. Even during my short stay at Chrysler, I have seen the positive
impact of these efforts. However, the case of OCMMs should not be forgotten. Rather it
should be used as a reminder of what can happen when these important suggestions are
not followed.
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Appendix A. ARS2 Static and Dynamic Test Results
Dodge Ram
STATIC 6/30/94 6
JSN#: 263808 - 263858
SIGMA AT 95%= i o. I
Dodge Ram
DYNAMIC 6/30/94 6
JSN#: 263860 - 263910
SENSOR
LTFRT F/A
LTFRT I/O
LTFRT U/D
LTREAR F/A
LTREAR I/O
LTREAR U/D
RTREAR F/A
RTREAR I/O
RTREAR U/D
RTFRT F/A
RTFRT I/O
RTFRT U/D
LIFTER
0.02
0.05
0.04
0.12
0.07
0.11
0.02
0.01
0.02
0.14
0.14
0.12
SENSOR
37 I/O
37 U/D
35 I/O
35 U/D
38 F/A
38 I/O
39 F/A
39I/O
7 I/O
7 U/D
6 I/O
6 U/D
3 F/A
3 I/O
3 U/D
2 F/A
2 I/O
2 U/D
44 F/A
44I/O
44U/D
34 F/A
34 U/D
40 I/O
40 U/D
50 F/A
50 U/D
LEFT
0.54
0.11
0.57
0.15
0.61
0.52
0.51
0.49
0.44
0.10
0.29
0.14
0.48
0.28
0.14
0.39
0.23
0.21
0.19
0.27
0.24
0.43
0.17
0.33
0.13
0.48
0.09
RIGHT
0.49
0.12
0.49
0.09
0.94
0.43
0.82
0.49
0.47
0.16
0.30
0.12
0.70
0.29
0.15
0.73
0.35
0.11
0.27
0.27
0.34
0.64
0.13
0.38
0.18
0.69
0.06
SENSOR
LTFRT F/A
LTFRT I/O
LTFRT U/D
LTREAR F/A
LTREAR I/O
LTREAR U/D
RTREAR F/A
RTREAR I/O
RTREAR U/D
RTFRT F/A
RTFRT I/O
RTFRT U/D
all units are 6-sigma variation in mm^2
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SIGMA AT95=-II .
LIFTER
0.14
0.09
0.08
0.12
0.07
0.11
0.14
0.05
0.04
0.12
0.18
0.17
SENSOR
37 I/O
37 U/D
35 I/O
35 U/D
38 F/A
38 I/O
39 F/A
39 I/O
7 I/O
7 U/D
6 1/O
6 U/D
3 F/A
3 I/O
3 U/D
2 F/A
2 I/O
2 U/D
44 F/A
44 I/O
44 U/D
34 F/A
34 U/D
40 I/O
40 U/D
50 F/A
50 U/D
LEFT
0.00
0.01
0.04
0.03
0.02
0.02
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.05
0.01
0.06
0.02
0.02
0.02
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.00
0.02
0.01
0.01
0.02
0.02
RIGHT
0.01
0.01
0.10
0.05
0.18
0.02
0.02
0.01
0.01
0.02
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.01
0.07
0.01
0.01
0.02
0.01
0.02
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.02
0.01
0.02
0.01
- - l , .
.
.--
Dodge Ram
STATIC 7/27/94 6 
JSN#: 269736 - 269785
SIGMA AT 9%= 0.12 
Dodge Ram
DYNAMIC 7/27/94 6 SIGMA AT 95%= 1.04 
JSN#: 269684- 269733
SENSOR
LTFRT F/A
LTFRT I/O
LTFRT U/D
LTREAR F/A
LTREAR I/O
LTREAR U/D
RTREAR F/A
RTREAR I/O
RTREAR U/D
RTFRT F/A
RTFRT I/O
RTFRT U/D
LIFTER
0.02
0.04
0.04
0.00
0.02
0.02
0.00
0.02
0.00
0.14
0.14
0.14
SENSOR
371 I/O
37 U/D
35 I/O'
35 U/D
38 F/A
381/0
39 F/A
39 I/O
7 I/O
7 U/D
6 I/O
6 U/D
3 F/A
3 I1/0O
3 U/D
2 F/A
21/0
2 U/D
44 F/A
44 I/O
44U/D
34 F/A
34 U/D
40 I/O
40 U/D
50 F/A
50 U/D
LEFT
1.04
0.12
1.08
0.10
0.32
0.84
0.26
0.94
0.76
0.14
0.30
0.32
0.24
0.10
0.32
0.14
0.12
0.30
0.14
0.38
0.08
N/A
N/A
0.48
0.20
0.18
0.12
RIGHT
1.00
0.08
1.02
0.14
0.88
0.92
1.10
0.86
0.78
0.06
0.30
0.28
0.94
0.10
0.18
1.04
0.14
0.34
0.24
0.22
0.42
0.72
0.12
0.70
0.14
0.86
0.12
SENSOR
LTFRT F/A
LTFRT I/O
LTFRT U/D
LTREAR F/A
LTREAR I/O
LTREAR U/D
RTREAR F/A
RTREAR I/O
RTREAR U/D
RTFRT F/A
RTFRT I/O
RTFRT U/D
all units are 6-sigma variation in mm^2
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LIFTER
0.10
0.04
0.06
0.02
0.04
0.04
0.02
0.06
0.04
0.14
0.15
0.14
SENSOR
37 I/O
37 U/D
35 I/O
35 U/D
38 F/A
38 I/O
39 F/A
39 I/O
7 I/O
7U/D
6 I/O
6 U/D
3 F/A
3 I/O
3 U/D
2 F/A
2 I/O
2 U/D
44 F/A
44 I/O0
44 U/D
34 F/A
34 U/D
40 I/O
40 U/D
50 F/A
50 U/D
LEFT
0.00
0.02
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.02
0.00
0.02
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.02
0.06
0.02
0.02
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
N/A
N/A
0.00
0.00
0.02
0.02
RIGHT
0.00
0.02
0.20
0.10
0.02
0.02
0.00
0.02
0.08
0.02
0.00
0.02
0.02
0.08
0.02
0.02
0.02
0.02
0.00
0.01
0.02
0.02
0.02
0.00
0.02
0.00
I .
l
Dakota Extended Cab
STATIC 8/9/94 6'
JSN#: 273826- 273877
SIGMA T 95%= 09 
Dakota Extended Cab
DYNAMIC 8/9/94 6 SIGMA AT 95%= 
JSN#: 273878 - 273928
SENSOR
LTFRT F/A
LTFRT I/O
LTFRT U/D
LTREAR F/A
LTREAR I/O
LTREAR U/D
RTREAR F/A
RTREAR I/O
RTREAR U/D
RTFRT F/A
RTFRT I/O
RTFRT U/D
LIFTER
0.02
0.04
0.02
0.04
0.02
0.02
0.02
0.02
0.02
0.26
0.36
0.98
SENSOR
25 I/O
25 U/D
39 I/O
39 U/D
41 F/A
41 I/O
30 F/A
30 1/O
32 I/O
32 U/D
34 I/O
34 U/D
38 F/A
38 I/O
38 U/D
5 I/O
5 U/D
37 F/A
37 1/O
37 U/D
21 F/A
21 U/D
60 F/A
60 U/D
LEFT
0.70
0.40
0.26
0.29
0.69
0.35
0.77
0.48
0.53
0.22
0.57
0.27
0.35
0.49
0.22
0.42
0.30
0.26
0.55
0.18
2.04
1.43
0.75
0.34
RIGHT
0.28
0.09
0.26
0.15
0.79
0.32
0.68
0.50
0.46
0.15
0.52
0.10
0.35
0.24
0.39
0.42
0.06
0.37
0.28
0.38
0.76
0.18
0.76
0.13
SENSOR
LTFRT F/A
LTFRT I/O
LTFRT U/D
LTREAR F/A
LTREAR I/O
LTREAR U/D
RTREAR F/A
RTREAR I/O
RTREAR U/D
RTFRT F/A
RTFRT I/O
RTFRT U/D
all units are 6-sigma variation in mmA2
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SENSOR
25 I/O
hZ UILJ
39 I/O
39 U/D
41 F/A
41 I/O
30 F/A
30 I/O
32 I/O
32 U/D
34 I/O
34 U/D
38 F/A
38 I/O
38 U/D
5 I/O
5 U/D
37 F/A
37 I/O
37 U/D
21 F/A
21 U/D
60 F/A
60 U/D
LEFT
U. 1.
0.01
0.00
0.02
0.01
0.02
0.02
0.01
0.01
0.02
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
1.73
1.37
0.01
0.04
LIFTER
0.08
0.16
0.12
0.14
0.34
0.22
0.08
0.20
0.14
0.24
0.48
1.04
RIGHT
0.02
',V.Vl.
0.02
0.03
0.19
0.07
0.03
0.02
0.13
0.08
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.03
0.02
0.02
0.02
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.05
0.04
0.03
0.02
I l 
I
0.151I' o,'s
Dodge Ram
STATIC 8/10/94 6 SIGMA AT 9%= 0.07
JSN#: 274483 - 274532
RIGHT
0.01
0.01
0.03
0.02
0.04
0.02
0.04
0.01
0.02
0.02
0.02
0.02
0.05
0.01
0.05
0.02
0.01
0.02
0.01
0.02
0.02
0.02
0.05
0.03
0.05
0.03
0.02
SENSOR
LTFRT F/A
LTFRT I/O
LTFRT U/D
LTREAR F/A
LTREAR I/O
LTREAR U/D
RTREAR F/A
RTREAR I/O
RTREAR U/D
RTFRT F/A
RTFRT I/O
RTFRT U/D
Dodge Ram
DYNAMIC 8/10/94 6 SIGMA AT 95%=[ 0.67 ||
JSN#: 274533 - 274582
LIFTER
0.02
0.04
0.04
0.06
0.00
0.00
0.06
0.02
0.00
0.14
0.16
0.20
SENSOR
37 I/O
37 U/D
351 I/O
35 U/D
38 F/A
38 I/O
39 F/A
39 I/O
7 1/O
7 U/D
6 I/O
6 U/D
3 F/A
3 I/O
3 U/D
2 F/A
2 I/O
2 U/D
44 F/A
44 I/O
44 U/D
34 F/A
34 U/D
40 I/O
40 U/D
50 F/A
50 U/D
LEFT
0.24
0.10
0.23
0.08
0.36
0.20
0.16
0.22
0.22
0.12
0.25
0.19
0.12
0.28
0.39
0.56
0.34
1.67
0.12
0.16
0.22
0.59
0.14
0.27
0.10
0.35
0.15
RIGHT
0.25
0.29
0.26
0.35
0.82
0.20
0.59
0.21
0.29
0.28
0.41
0.60
0.53
0.45
0.62
0.63
0.32
0.67
0.21
0.45
0.15
0.66
i 0.50
0.36
0.30
0.22
SENSOR
LTFRT F/A
LTFRT I/O
LTFRT U/D
LTREAR F/A
LTREAR I/O
LTREAR U/D
RTREAR F/A
RTREAR I/O
RTREAR U/D
RTFRT F/A
RTFRT I/O
RTFRT U/D
LIFTER
0.08
0.14
0.14
0.08
0.10
0.04
0.06
0.04
0.02
0.12
0.16
0.18
all units are 6-sigma variation in mmA2
83
SENSOR
37 I/O
37 U/D
35 I/O
35 U/D
38 F/A
38 I/O
39 F/A
39 I/O
7 I/O
7 U/D
6 I/O
6 U/D
3 F/A
3 I/O
3 U/D
2 F/A
2 I/O
2 U/D
44 F/A
44I/O
44 U/D
34 F/A
34 U/D
40 I/O
40 U/D
50 F/A
50 U/D
LEFT
0.15
0.05
0.05
0.04
0.02
0.02
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.02
0.01
0.10
0.01
0.12
0.44
0.03
1.49
0.01
0.01
0.02
0.01
0.07
0.06
0.02
0.03
0.02
l
h_
-
.
Dodge Ram
STATIC 8/12/94 6'
JSN#: 276736 - 276785
SENSOR
37 I/O
37 U/D
35I/O
35 U/D
38 F/A
38I/O
39 F/A
39 I/O
7 I/O
7 U/D
6 I/O
6 U/D
3 F/A
3 I/O
3 U/D
2 F/A
2 I/O
2 U/D
44 F/A
44 I/O
44U/D
34 F/A
34 U/D
40I/O
40 U/D
50 F/A
50 U/D
LEFT
0.05
0.03
0.05
0.03
0.08
0.06
0.01
0.03
0.03
0.03
0.04
0.03
0.12
0.04
0.12
0.03
0.05
0.11
0.01
0.06
0.03
0.01
0.02
0.07
0.02
0.03
0.03
RIGHT
0.05
0.02
0.05
0.32
0.07
0.03
0.04
0.04
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.04
0.08
0.09
0.01
0.09
0.04
0.02
0.08
0.02
0.01
0.02
0.04
0.03
0.03
SIGMA AT 95%=.15 
SENSOR
LTFRT F/A
LTFRT I/O
LTFRT U/D
LTREAR F/A
LTREAR I/O
LTREAR U/D
RTREAR F/A
RTREAR I/O
RTREAR U/D
RTFRT F/A
RTFRT I/O
RTFRT U/D
all units are 6-sigma variation in mmA2
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LIFTER
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
.
Dodge Ram
STATIC 8/18/94
JSN#: 278269 - 2783
Dodge Ram
6 SIGMA AT 95%= 0.10 I] DYNAMIC 8/18/94 6 SIGMA AT 95%= 035 
18 JSN#: 278321 - 278370
SENSOR
LTFRT F/A
LTFRT I/O
LTFRT U/D
LTREAR F/A
LTREAR I/O
LTREAR U/D
RTREAR F/A
RTREAR I/O
RTREAR U/D
RTFRT F/A
RTFRT I/O
RTFRT U/D
LIFTER
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
SENSOR
37 I/O
37 U/D
35 I/O
35 U/D
38 F/A
38 I/O
39 F/A
39 I/O
7 I/O
7 U/D
6 I/O
6 U/D
3 F/A
3 1/O
3 U/D
2 F/A
2 I/O
2 U/D
44 F/A
44 I/O
44 U/D
34 F/A
34 U/D
40I/O
40 U/D
50 F/A
50 U/D
LEFT
0.24
0.04
0.23
0.08
0.24
0.23
0.35
0.20
0.19
0.06
0.12
0.11
0.31
0.13
0.10
0.27
0.13
0.15
0.11
0.13
0.17
0.25
0.16
0.19
0.14
0.31
0.11
RIGHT
0.24
0.11
0.28
0.08
0.31
0.18
0.32
0.16
0.14
0.17
0.09
0.28
0.33
0.14
0.32
0.28
0.14
0.37
0.20
0.15
0.23
0.21
0.27
0.25
0.26
0.10
SENSOR
LTFRT F/A
LTFRT I/O
LTFRT U/D
LTREAR F/A
LTREAR I/O
LTREAR U/D
RTREAR F/A
RTREAR I/O
RTREAR U/D
RTFRT F/A
RTFRT I/O
RTFRT U/D
all units are 6-sigma variation in mm^2
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LIFTER
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
SENSOR
37 I/O
37 U/D
35 1/O
35 U/D
38 F/A
38 I/O
39 F/A
39 I/O
7 1/O
7 U/D
6 I/O
6 U/D
3 F/A
3 I/O
3 U/D
2 F/A
2 I/O
2 U/D
44 F/A
44 I/O
44 U/D
34 F/A
34 U/D
40 I/O
40 U/D
50 F/A
50 U/D
LEFT
0.01
0.01
0.08
0.02
.0.10
0.02
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.10
0.01
0.11
0.01
0.01
0.03
0.00
0.01
0.00
0.01
0.02
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.03
RIGHT
0.02
0.01
0.09
0.04
0.02
0.02
0.02
0.00
0.01
0.01
0.02
0.02
0.04
0.01
0.04
0.01
0.01
0.03
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.04
0.02
0.03
0.02
.
. .
Representative Production Data for Lifter Columns
JSN#: 288535-288977
SENSOR
LTFRT F/A
LTFRT I/O
LTFRT U/D
LTREAR F/A
LTREAR I/O
LTREAR UID
RTREAR F/A
RTREAR I/O
RTREAR U/D
RTFRT F/A
RTFRT I/O
RTFRT U/D
6-sigma mean
0.27 1.73
0.40 -0.34
0.43 0.74
0.56 0.48
1.11 0.17
1.18 0.47
0.39 0.91
1.02 0.99
0.91 0.71
0.29 -0.08
0.27 0.41
0.46 -0.06
6-sigma mean
0.24 0.02
0.32 0.02
0.40 0.23
0.32 0.19
0.95 0.14
1.06 0.48
0.34 0.67
0.83 -0.04
0.74 0.22
0.44 -0.37
0.48 0.11
0.85 0.09
6-sigma mean
0.30 1.74
0.38 -0.32
0.43 0.75
0.42 0.15
0.67 0.29
1.60 0.17
1.09 0.67
5.56 0.30
3.44 0.15
0.76 -0.30
2.11 0.72
1.24 -0.13
N-EXT
mean values should be zero
mean values in mm; 6-sigma values in mmA2
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__ 1
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Appendix B. OCMM Downtime Log- # of Vehicles Not Measured
Perceptron JSN tracking
START JSN END JSN TOTAL
0
0
255125 255808 684
255809 256908 1100
256909 257977 1069
257978 259182 1205
259183 260169 987
260170 260289 120
0
260390 261451 1062
261452 262587 1136
262588 263798 1211
263912 265121 1210
265122 265999 878
0
0
0
0
266000 266596 597
266597 266877 281
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
266882 267600 719
267601 268412 812
268413 269284 872
269287 269559 273
0
0
0
269560 269676 117
0
269786 270687 902
270688 271007 320
0
0
ARS2 Production Counts
IST SHIFT 2ND SHIFT TOTAL
0 0 0
0 0 0
552 554 1106
633 565 1198
478 541 1019
588 539 1127
532 522 1054
0 0 0
0 0 0
1138 566 1704
544 574 1118
617 550 1167
557 605 1162
296 561 857
583 0 583
0 0 0
0 0 0
562 429 991
524 394 918
551 527 1078
92 0 92
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 O 0
313 405 718
362 451 813
474 399 873
409 466 875
450 408 858
0 0 0
0 0 0
427 458 885
339 494 833
407 496 903
450 453 903
439 407 846
434 442 876
Total
Vehicles Missed**
0
0
422
98
-50
-78
67
-120
0
642
-18
-44
-48
-21
583
0
0
991
321
797
92
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
-1
1
1
602
858
0
0
768
833
1
583
846
876
87
DATE
6/18/94
6/19/94
6/20/94
6/21/94
6/22/94
6/23/94
6/24/94
6/25/94
6/26/94
6/27/94
6/28/94
6/29/94
6/30/94
7/1/94
7/2/94
7/3/94
7/4/94
7/5/94
7/6/94
7/7/94
7/8/94
7/9/94
7/10/94
7/11/94
7/12/94
7/13/94
7/14/94
7/15/94
7/16/94
7/17/94
7/18/94
7/19/94
7/20/94
7/21/94
7/22/94
7/23/94
7/24/94
7/25/94
7/26/94
7/27/94
7/28/94
7/29/94
7/30/94
1
-
. S .
_
Perceptron JSN tracking
START JSN END JSN TOTAL
0
271008 271749 742
271750 272147 398
272148 272855 708
272856 273332 477
0
0
0
273334 273824 491
273930 274482 553
274585 275695 1111
275696 276731 1036
276786 277345 560
277346 277419 74
0 0 0
0 0 0
277420 277521 102
277522 278267 746
278371 279380 1010
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
279384 280350 967
280351 281333 983
281334 281368 35
281369 281654 286
281655 282681 1027
282682 282683 2
0 0 0
0 0 0
282684 282967 284
1 27147
ARS2 Production Counts
IST SHIFT 2ND SHIFT TOTAL
0 0 0
460 512 972
469 478 947
468 464 932
429 468 897
460 493 953
0 0 0
0 0 0
514 527 1041
400 270 670
573 590 1163
472 587 1059
339 237 576
548 622 1170
0 0 0
492 350 842
496 557 1053
564 579 1143
536 610 1146
573 561 1134
454 610 1064
0 0 0
462 552 1014
547 567 1114
500 634 1134
511 593 1104
562 555 1117
557 385 942
0 0 0
0
497 576 1073
48817
Total
Vehicles Missed**
0
230
549
224
420
953
0
0
550
117
52
23
16
1096
0
842
951
397
136
1134
1064
0
47
131
1099
818
90
940
0
0
789
21670
% of ARS2 production measured: 55.61%
* ARS2 data was found to be inaccurate at times, therefore, this data should only be used as anil estimate
** Negative numbers indicate that testing was done on those dates
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DATE
7/31/94
8/1/94
8/2/94
8/3/94
8/4/94
8/5/94
8/6/94
8/7/94
8/8/94
8/9/94
8/10/94
8/11/94
8/12/94
8/13/94
8/14/94
8/15/94
8/16/94
8/17/94
8/18/94
8/19/94
8/20/94
8/21/94
8/22/94
8/23/94
8/24/94
8/25/94
8/26/94
8/27/94
8/28/94
8/29/94
8/30/94
totals
-l-
- - - I
Appendix C. Sample "2mm Program" Case Studies
* CASE I Left Aperture H/L variation in the
Body Comnlete
PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION:
Front part of the Aperture panel complete shift in the Z direction
(High/Low) during framing operation.
55L
/ \ 32L
SL 19L
cowl side m"ter hole
ANALYSIS:
Interference between Cowl Side panel and Sill Body side panel caused by
panel misload during loading operation in the Underbody line.
Problem happened for 5% body-in-white.
89
IklLti1 \(lit 1)N1
it was suggested to change Cowl Side panel flange match with
Sill Body side panel (stamping).
cowl side panel
interfererence
cowl side is lo¢
too high
cowl side panel
Incorrect correct
EVALUATION:
Problem did not happened for last 400 bodies.
VARIATION REDUCTION:
Sensor 19 shows error - out of range - when discrepancy related to the case
study VII happened
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i
5_enYor 21R- y- z SAMP F
BEFORE (01/21/92)
AFTER (02/13/92)
* CASE X W/House panel location variation
PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION:
Wheelhouse panel was misloaded in the OP-40 ( Aperture line) causing
deformation of the PLP hole. It happened around 15 times during first 3
weeks of Launch
ANALYSIS:
Rough locator in the OP-40 does not protect panel against misload in the Z
direction ( distance between panel and wiper is 30 mm. There is no rough'
locator in the X direction.
CORRECTIVE ACTION:
Rough locator was moved close to the panel controling more precisely
position of the panel in the Z direction during loading operation. It was not
added rough locator in the X direction.
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1.95
1.36
3.83
2.07
142
61
Sensor 21R Y Z SA PL.E
EVALUATION:
Wheelhouse panel was not misloaded for last 500 panels.
Sensor 1161, X Y 7
BEFORE (01/27/92)
AFTER (02/12/92)
2.10
1.21
4.69
1.33
2.02
1.88
92
SAMPI .E
81
106
Y
_ __ __ ___
